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Abstract 
SERDAR ALDATMAZ: Private Equity in the Global Economy: Evidence on Industry 
Spillovers. 
(Under the Direction of Greg W. Brown) 
 
Using a novel dataset on global private equity investments in 19 industries across 48 
countries, I find that following private equity investments employment, profitability, and 
labor productivity increase for publicly listed companies in the same country and industry. 
This suggests that positive externalities created by private equity firms are absorbed by other 
companies within the same industry. These effects are more pronounced in country-industries 
with higher levels of competition, where it is more likely that the competitive pressure from 
private equity-backed targets forces industry peers to improve. Furthermore, the results are 
concentrated in countries with moderate levels of innovative capacities, which are shown to 
be the best absorbers of productivity spillovers in studies on spillovers from foreign direct 
investments. I further find that capital expenditures of public firms also grow faster 
subsequent to private equity investments. On the financial side, I provide evidence that 
industry stock market returns increase after the industry receives venture capital, while 
buyout investments lead to higher debt levels within the industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Most of the existing studies on private equity find evidence for increased firm performance 
following the transactions (Cumming et al. 2007, Kaplan and Stromberg 2009). Given all of 
the research and publicity about private equity investments, it is surprising that little evidence 
is available to determine whether they have on net a positive or negative impact on the 
industries they invest in. Building on the idea of knowledge spillovers introduced by 
Marshall (1890), a large literature in economics has examined how technological 
advancements and productivity gains at some companies in an industry spill over onto the 
other companies within the same industry.
1
 Similarly, the impact of private equity capital 
may not be limited to the companies receiving investment; it might create positive and 
negative externalities that have implications for the industry as a whole. Hence, how overall 
industry dynamics change following private equity investments is an important question that 
needs to be answered to properly frame the broader debate concerning private equity's role 
for the economy. 
Using a novel dataset on actual private equity investments between 1990 and 2011, this 
paper explores the dynamic relationship between private equity capital and broad industry 
growth. Focusing on how aggregate industry measures of publicly listed companies change 
following a private equity capital investment into an industry, I am able to measure the
                                                          
1
 In a review of studies related to spillovers from multinational corporations onto local companies, Blomstrom 
and Kokko (1998) conclude that technology and productivity spillovers take place within an industry as 
companies compete and directly interact with each other or knowledge is transferred through employees. 
Caves (1971), Blomstrom and Persson (1983), Bolmstrom (1986), Blomstrom and Wolff (1994), Kokko (1994), 
Kokko (1996), and Javorcik (2004) are examples of studies providing evidence for the existence of productivity 
spillovers from foreign multi nationals into domestic companies.   
2 
 
spillovers from target companies that receive actual private equity capital to the publicly 
listed companies within the same industry. 
Jensen (1989) argues that private equity is the superior business model when compared to 
public equity as it provides a better alignment of incentives between owners and managers as 
well as a more efficient management of resources. Following Jensen, many papers that study 
the impact of private equity transactions on the target companies provide evidence for the 
positive impacts on firm-level performance. However, the popular press, labor unions, and 
policy makers remain concerned about the private equity industry's business model in terms 
of its impact on the real economy.
2
 As such, how private equity investments affect industry 
performance is a question that is of great importance not only to academic researchers but 
also to practitioners and policy makers. On one hand, with the entrance of private equity 
investments into an industry, firms not receiving investments could be forced to improve 
efficiency by utilizing the new technologies and practices to compete with the more efficient 
private equity-backed firms.
3
 Thus, there are potential industry-wide externalities from the 
competitive pressure introduced by private equity. If companies are capable of absorbing the 
spillovers from private-equity backed firms, the industry overall might experience 
performance gains. On the other hand, if the companies that do not receive private equity 
investment cannot keep up with the new technologies and the competitive pressure, the 
                                                          
2
 Reports by the Financial Services Authority (2006) and the Service Employees International Union (2007) 
discuss concerns about private equity and its implications for the economy. 
 
3
 Local companies either imitate the new technologies and practices introduced by private equity firms at their 
portfolio companies, or are forced to come up with more efficient methods themselves to respond to the 
increased level of competition within the industry. 
 
3 
 
efficiency gains at the investment-receiving companies might drive demand away from their 
competitors.
4
 Hence, the pressure might negatively affect the rest of the industry.
5
 
As a motivating example, consider the buyout of the Hertz Corporation. The company 
was bought out by a group of private equity firms in 2005 and its performance significantly 
improved following the transaction. After the buyout of Hertz, the two main competitors in 
the same industry, Avis Budget and Dollar Thrifty, also implemented new strategies to 
increase efficiency, which most likely were triggered by the competitive pressure from the 
more efficient private equity-backed Hertz. Indeed, over the two years following the buyout 
of Hertz, profitability and productivity both increased for Avis Budget and Dollar Thrifty.
6
 
Similarly, using a large sample of global private equity investments, I study if there are 
productivity spillovers from private equity investments onto the public companies within the 
same country and industry. I indeed find that private equity capital invested in an industry 
leads to higher employment growth, profitability growth, and labor productivity growth 
within the public firms in the same domestic industry: on average, a one standard deviation 
increase in the amount of private equity capital invested (adjusted by industry sales) leads to 
a 0.8% increase in employment growth, 1.3% increase in labor productivity growth, and 
2.6% increase in profitability growth. 
Given the different structures of buyout and venture capital transactions, I also compare 
how the impact of private equity on the performance of public firms is different after buyout 
                                                          
4
 Aitken and Harrison (1999), for example, find that the entrance of more efficient foreign companies 
negatively impacts the performance of local firms because they attract customers away from domestic firms. 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Feinberg and Majumdar (2001), and Kathuria (2002) are other examples of 
studies providing evidence for negative impacts of spillovers from foreign direct investments. 
  
5
 Even if the competitive pressure drives the most inefficient companies out of the market, that might still be 
beneficiary for the economy as a whole in the long-run where private equity-backed firms act as catalysts of a 
constructive destruction process. 
 
6
 See Section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion of the buyout of Hertz Corporation. 
4 
 
versus venture capital investments. My findings indicate that buyout investments lead to 
spillovers through financial engineering creating higher leverage and stronger governance, 
while venture capital investments create positive industry-wide externalities through the 
introduction of new technologies and innovation. 
While it is generally a challenge in private equity studies to pin down which way the 
direction of causality goes due to the potential endogeneity of private equity investments, the 
implementation of the panel VAR to some extent mitigates the problem of reverse causality.
7
 
I find no evidence that past values of employment growth, profitability growth, or labor 
productivity growth are associated with the amount of private equity capital invested in an 
industry. Thus, I am able to identify a causal link from private equity to the real economy to 
the extent that private equity investments are exogenous after incorporating all the 
information about how the industry did in the past. While this finding excludes reverse 
causality stemming from past values of industry performance affecting private equity 
investments, there might be other time-varying
8
 unobservables that are driving the findings. 
Notably, one could argue that private equity companies have superior foresight and time their 
investments based on their expectations about the industry prospects going forward. It would 
admittedly be impossible to perfectly control for expectations and fully exclude the 
alternative explanation of market timing. However, although no single finding would be 
                                                          
7
 The ordering of the variables in the VAR model is important as it determines which variable affects the other 
variables contemporaneously and with a lag, or only with a lag. In the analysis throughout, I assume that 
private equity capital affects the industry variables both contemporaneously and with a lag, while it is 
impacted only with a lag. A caveat to this is, if private equity companies observe industry performance and 
quickly time their investment within the same year, the VAR where private equity capital is the first variable in 
the system will not capture this. However, all the results in the paper stay the same when the ordering of the 
variables is changed.  
 
8
 The panel VAR estimation allows for country-industry and time fixed effects, so any time-invariant 
heterogeneity is controlled for in the specifications. 
 
5 
 
conclusive by itself, the evidence provided throughout the paper, including the different 
findings for buyout versus venture capital as well as the cross-sectional findings, altogether 
are indicative of a causal relationship where private equity investments lead to spillovers.
9
 
Next, I explore the dynamic relationship between industry-wide investment among the 
public firms and private equity, and find that higher levels of private equity capital lead to 
higher growth in industry-wide capital expenditures suggesting that private equity companies 
not only contribute to short-term performance advancement but can also facilitate long-run 
growth through more real investment at the industry-level.
10
  
Lastly, I focus on two financial variables: industry-wide net debt growth and stock 
market returns. I find that net debt of the industry also grows faster following buyout capital 
investments into the industry suggesting that the financial structures introduced by private 
equity companies at the portfolio companies in buyout transactions also spill over onto the 
other companies in the industry leading to increased levels of leverage. Furthermore, while 
there is no evidence for private equity capital chasing returns, i.e. past values of industry 
returns are not related to the level of private equity capital invested, overall stock market 
returns increase following venture capital investments indicating that spillovers of 
operational improvements have implications for firm values as well. 
The dataset used in the paper is provided by The Burgiss Group and is unique in its 
detailed coverage of private equity investments at the global level. The data are aggregated 
using actual fund investments, both buyout and venture capital, in portfolio companies. It 
                                                          
9
 See Section 5.6 for a discussion of the alternative market-timing hypothesis in greater detail. 
  
10
 More investment will lead to future growth if the investments have positive net present values. Assuming 
the increased investment is made in new technologies that lead to higher efficiency; it will facilitate long-run 
growth. 
 
6 
 
covers a total private equity capital of $1.3 trillion invested in 48 countries across 19 
industries from 1990 to 2011 and is the first dataset providing actual dollars of invested 
private equity capital at the industry level across a large number of countries.
11
 
While the existing evidence on private equity has been mostly on U.S. and European 
data, studying global investments in a cross-country setting is important for two reasons. 
First, while private equity has been largely a U.S.- and U.K.-only phenomenon pre-1990, the 
share across the two countries out of the total amount of global private equity capital invested 
has come down to around 60% in 2011; in other words, 40% of the total global private equity 
capital is now being invested in countries other than the U.S. and the U.K. Abolishment of 
entry barriers for foreign capital coupled with high growth potentials in developing countries 
are most likely the main reasons behind this trend. Despite the fact that private equity has 
become a global asset class, there is very little evidence on how private equity impacts 
performance globally due to lack of good research quality data at the global level.  
Second, the cross-section of countries allows me to study the different impacts of private 
equity in countries and industries with different characteristics, which provides evidence 
consistent with a causal effect of private equity on industry spillovers. Both the implications 
of the private equity business model and how well the spillovers are absorbed within an 
industry might be different depending on the institutional environment as well as the level of 
technological advancement in a country. Strong legal institutions are necessary for private 
equity companies to better implement the governance structures that make their portfolio 
companies more efficient (Cumming and Walz 2009). As such, I predict and find that the 
positive effects of private equity investments on the public companies within the same 
                                                          
11
 Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2012) also use private equity fund flow data supplied by The Burgiss Group in 
their study of private equity fund performance. 
7 
 
industry are concentrated in countries with a stronger legal environment, measured by the 
quality of legal institutions and intellectual property rights.
12
  
For spillovers from new technologies to be more effective, the companies that do not 
receive investment should be in need of new technologies, i.e. they should possess fewer 
technological skills. At the same time, some level of existing technological skills is needed 
for the spillovers to be absorbed. In line with this, the existing evidence on spillovers from 
foreign direct investments (FDI) shows that productivity spillovers are strongest for 
companies in countries with moderate levels of technological advancement.
13
  
Lastly, I also explore how the results differ depending on the level of competition within 
a country-industry. Spillovers resulting from the competitive pressure coming from the more 
efficient private equity-backed companies are expected to be stronger in country-industries 
that are more competitive, where the pressure would be highest. Indeed, I find that the 
positive impact of private equity investments are more pronounced in country-industries with 
higher levels of competition. These cross-sectional results altogether provide support for a 
causal effect of private equity investments on industry spillovers as alternative stories such as 
market timing would not predict these cross-sectional differences.  
This paper contributes to several literatures in finance and economics. First, providing 
evidence on the positive impact of private equity capital on industry performance at the 
global level, it contributes to the large body of studies that examine how company 
                                                          
12
 The protection of intellectual property rights is particularly important as it impacts how extensive the 
private equity companies would introduce new technologies at their portfolio companies. Mansfield (1994) 
finds that technology spillovers are weakest in countries with weak intellectual property protection. 
 
13
 Kokko (1994) and Kokko et al. (1996) are examples of studies that find that moderate technology levels lead 
to highest spillovers from FDI.} Similarly, I also find that the spillover effects from private equity investments 
are not present for countries that have very high or very low innovative capacities. The positive spillover 
results are concentrated in countries with moderate levels of innovative capacities. 
8 
 
performance changes post private equity transactions (Kaplan 1989, Cao and Lerner 2009, 
Davis et al. 2009). With the evidence for positive spillover effects at the industry-level, the 
paper supports and complements the existing firm-level evidence. Second, it contributes to 
the existing spillover literature by exploring spillover of management practices, knowledge, 
and technology from private equity-backed companies to the public companies within the 
same industry. It provides evidence for a different channel for spillovers other than 
multinational corporations, the most discussed channel in the literature.
14
 Lastly, it also 
contributes to the large literature of finance and growth that examines the link between 
financial development and economic growth of countries. Existing studies look at how the 
development of a country's public and credit markets affects output growth by providing a 
better allocation of capital (King and Levine 1993, Levine 2004). I explore the impact of a 
different financial asset class, private equity, and show that its entrance into an industry also 
enhances industry growth by creating positive externalities within the industry. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next chapter further discusses the 
related literatures and how the paper fits in, together with a real example of industry 
spillovers after a private equity transaction. Chapter 3 introduces the data and presents some 
descriptive analysis, as well as outlines the empirical strategy, the panel VAR approach. 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical results, and Chapter 5 concludes.
                                                          
14
 This is an important contribution as 'the degree to which other modes of international business (besides 
traditional inward FDI) generate appropriate spillover benefits for the host country is an exceedingly 
important policy issue for which there is a disappointing amount of evidence.' (Blomstrom et al. 1999, p.15). 
 
 
2. Background 
According to Kaplan and Stromberg (2009), private equity companies improve their portfolio 
companies using practices that can be summarized under three main headings: financial 
engineering, governance engineering and operational engineering. Financial and governance 
engineering refer to the structure of ownership and financing implemented at these 
transactions that lead to better monitoring and incentive alignment to overcome agency 
problems at the portfolio companies, while operational engineering refers to management 
practices that large and experienced private equity firms use to improve operational 
efficiencies of their portfolio companies. Firm-level performance after private equity 
transactions has been examined extensively in the existing literature in studies looking at 
transactions in the U.S., the U.K. or European Union countries. 
In his seminal work, Kaplan (1989) tracks large management buyouts of publicly held 
companies and finds evidence for improved operating performance at these companies as 
well as increased market values. Similarly, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) study reverse 
leveraged buyouts (LBO), and find that profitability at target companies increase following 
the transactions. More recently, Davis et al. (2009) show that U.S. firms receiving a private 
equity investment experience higher subsequent productivity growth. Complementing the 
existing evidence on operating performance, Cao and Lerner (2009) provide evidence for 
superior stock market performance for reverse LBOs. Studying a sample of private equity-
backed companies in Western Europe, Acharya et al. (2009) also find evidence for 
performance gains from private equity. Besides the implications of private equity for
10 
 
operating and stock market performance, its impact on employment receives the most 
attention from the press, and labor unions. 
Private equity companies are typically blamed for sacrificing jobs for short-term 
profits. In one of the most detailed studies on this issue, Davis et al. (2011) examine 
establishment-level job creation and destruction at U.S. establishments using data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. They find that private equity-backed companies have higher job 
destruction at existing establishments, but at the same time higher job creation at new 
establishments. Their conclusion is that the net impact of private equity transactions on 
employment is very moderate. Similarly, Popov and Roosenboom (2008) find that venture 
capital leads to higher new business creation in their study of 21 European countries over the 
period 1998 - 2008. 
Most of the existing studies on private equity transactions have found evidence for 
superior subsequent performance at the firm-level. However, it is still unknown how private 
equity transactions affect the other firms, which do not receive private equity capital, within 
the same country-industry. In this paper, I study the performance of all the public companies 
within a country-industry as a whole in an attempt to capture the spillovers from target 
companies to the rest of the industry.  
There is a large-established literature that has provided evidence for the existence of 
productivity spillovers.
15
 For example, several studies on different countries, including Caves 
(1974) on Australia, Globerman (1979) on Canada, and Blomstrom and Persson (1983) on 
                                                          
15
 The idea of spillovers was first introduced by Marshall (1890) in the form of knowledge spillovers among 
firms, and then improved by Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986). Later, Glaeser et al. (1992) put the ideas 
together and defined the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model of knowledge spillovers, which argues that 
knowledge is industry specific and spills over within an industry once its created. 
11 
 
Mexico, have shown positive spillover effects from FDI to domestic industries (see 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998 for a review). Similarly, Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) provide 
evidence for research and development spillovers within an industry and find that overall 
costs in an industry decline following improvements in technology as knowledge expands to 
externality-receiving firms. On the other hand, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that the 
entrance of foreign companies negatively impacts the performance of local firms because 
they attract customers away from domestic firms raising questions about the existence of 
positive spillover effects. 
Similar to FDI, private equity firms also introduce new technologies, know-how and 
managerial expertise to the industry through their portfolio companies. These new practices 
would then potentially spill over within the industry through different channels
16
 and lead to 
industry-wide efficiency gains. As such, studying the impact of private equity on overall 
industry dynamics is of first order importance to answer broader questions about private 
equity and its implications for the economy. 
This paper is closest to the recent study by Bernstein et al. (2012). In their study of 26 
OECD countries between 1991 and 2007, they find that industries which had at least one 
private equity transaction in the past five years grow faster in terms of employment and 
productivity. They, however, do not find evidence for differences between industries with 
high versus low amounts of private equity capital. There are several significant differences 
between this paper and theirs. First, they look at the overall industry performance following a 
private equity transaction, including the companies receiving private equity capital and 
                                                          
16
 One channel of spillovers is that the other firms copy the best practices and new technologies of the private 
equity-backed firms. It could also be the case that they are forced to come up with their own practices and 
technologies to become more efficient in order to keep up with the competitive pressure from the more 
efficient private equity-backed firms. 
12 
 
others, while I focus on aggregate industry measures of publicly listed companies only. This 
allows me to more clearly identify the spillover effects from private equity-backed 
companies to companies that do not receive private equity capital within the same industry. 
Second, their measure of private equity is the existence of any private equity transaction in an 
industry, whereas I look at actual dollars of private equity capital invested. Lastly, they study 
a sample of OECD countries between 1991 and 2007, while I study 48 countries, including 
both developed and developing nations. This allows me to provide the first evidence on the 
impact of private equity investments in developing nations and also allows me to compare 
how the spillover effects are different for countries and country-industries with different 
characteristics, which also provides support for a causal effect. 
The buyout of the car rental company Hertz was one of the biggest buyout 
transactions in history. The company was acquired for $14 billion by a private equity 
consortium consisting of the Carlyle group, Merrill Lynch's investment arm, and Clayton 
Dubilier & Rice at the end of 2005. After the buyout, significant changes were made at the 
company to cut costs and improve operational efficiency. For example, before the buyout 
once a car was dropped off at a rental location, it was being cleaned and refueled at different 
work stations, which the new management realized was creating too much idle time and 
decreasing operational efficiency. To increase efficiency, cleaning stations were moved to 
where the cars are being refueled resulting in a doubling of the number of cars that could be 
processed every hour. In additional to operational changes, the private equity group also 
changed the governance structure of the company and started to more closely monitor the 
management.
17
 Shortly after the buyout, the private equity group filed for an initial public 
                                                          
17
 The New York Times article "Is Private Equity Giving Hertz a Boost?" published on September 23, 2007 
discusses the Hertz buyout and talks about the operational changes at Hertz following the buyout. 
13 
 
offering for Hertz. This quick move raised concerns about the intentions of the private equity 
companies backing Hertz, and critics argued that market-timing drove their decision. They 
were criticized for being focused on short-term profits for their own sake rather than 
operational improvements at the company that would facilitate future growth. Despite all 
these critics, the company was taken public at a value of $17 billion suggesting that the 
improvements made by the private equity group lead to a 21% increase in firm value.
18
 
During the same time period, Avis Budget and Dollar Thrifty, the two biggest 
competitors of Hertz, experienced significant performance gains after Hertz was bought out 
by the private equity consortium. For example, in 2006 Avis Budget introduced a process 
improvement initiative called "Performance Excellence", designed to make vehicle rental 
processes more efficient, cut costs, and enhance the customer rental experience. Similarly, 
Dollar Thrifty announced the implementation of several cost-saving initiatives, including 
information technology outsourcing as well as more investment into improvement of existing 
IT systems to increase efficiency. These efforts are most likely a response to the competitive 
pressure from Hertz, suggesting the existence of spillovers from competitive pressure. In 
fact, profit margins increased by 10% and 7%, while labor productivity, measured by sales 
per employee, also increased by 5% and 6% at Avis Budget and Dollar Thrifty, respectively, 
from 2006 to 2007. During the same period, employment did not change at these companies. 
This specific example suggests that practices and technologies causing efficiency 
gains at a private equity-backed company might spill over onto other companies within the 
same industry over a very short period of time due to the competitive pressure, and lead to 
overall performance gains at the firms that do not receive private equity capital. Hence, the 
                                                          
18
 Bloomberg Businessweek article "Buy It, Strip It, Then Flip It" published on August 6, 2006 discusses the IPO 
decision of the private equity group shortly after buying out Hertz Corporation. 
14 
 
rest of the paper tries to answer if this is indeed the case on a study of 48 countries and 19 
industries between 1990 – 2011
 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The private equity investment data comes from The Burgiss Group (Burgiss), a software 
company providing record keeping and performance analysis services to the largest 
institutional investors in the private equity universe. The major advantage of this dataset over 
others is that Burgiss sources its data exclusively from limited partners, as opposed to general 
partners (GP); so, the typical biases associated with GP-sourced datasets are not present.
19
 
Recently, Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2012) use Burgiss data and compare the existing 
evidence on fund performance found using other commercially available private equity 
datasets to the evidence from Burgiss. For detailed information about Burgiss and its 
coverage of the private equity universe, see Harris et al. (2012) and Brown et al. (2011).
20
 
The specific Burgiss data used in this paper has actual dollar amounts of private 
equity capital invested globally, including both buyout and venture capital, at the country-
industry-year level over the period 1990 - 2011. The data cover over 77 countries and 
provide aggregated company level private equity capital invested at the industry level based 
on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). So, an example of a unit of observation
                                                          
19
 GP-sourced databases on private equity have significant biases as GPs might strategically stop reporting. 
Burgiss sources its data entirely from LPs, and data are cross-checked across different investors in the same 
fund, which leads to a high level of integrity and completeness. 
 
20
 One caveat that should be taken into account about the Burgiss data is that it might be biased towards large 
institutional investors, which is a shared feature with the other datasets. However, investments from the large 
institutional investors make up a very large portion of the total private equity capital raised around the world. 
 
16 
 
used in the analysis would be the $ amount of private equity capital invested in India in the 
technology industry in 2000. This is the first dataset having actual dollar amounts of private 
equity capital invested at this level of detail globally. As the dataset is unique and novel in its 
coverage of private equity investments around the globe, some simple descriptive analysis is 
to follow.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of private equity capital invested globally among 48 
countries in the sample between 1990 – 2011. Panel A ranks the countries based on the total 
dollar amount of private equity capital received, with amounts in million U.S. dollars and 
inflation adjusted to 2011. Column 1 shows that the U.S. and the U.K. have received the 
highest amount of private equity capital over the time period. While venture capital makes up 
about 25% of total capital invested in the U.S., its share is less than 10% for the U.K. 
Developed European countries are also among the countries receiving large amounts of 
investments. Similar to the U.K., more than 90% of the total amount of capital received is 
buyout capital in these European countries. Another important observation to note is that 
China and India rank 3rd and 7th, receiving more than $37 billion and $23 billion of private 
equity investment, respectively. About 30% of the total amount of capital invested is venture 
capital in China, whereas venture capital makes up 17% of the investments in India. 
In Panel B, countries are ranked by the total amount of private equity capital received as a 
percentage of their GDP.
21
 U.S. and U.K. are again on top of the list. Sweden and Denmark 
rank 3rd and 4th while they were ranked only 9th and 14th in Panel A, so they actually 
received a large amount of capital when compared to the size of their economies. Ireland, 
Israel, Bulgaria, Singapore and Czech Republic also rank high based on the GDP adjusted 
                                                          
21
 The ratio is calculated separately for each year between 1990 and 2011, and then the average is reported 
for each country.  
 
17 
 
numbers. China and India, on the other hand, go down the list due to their large economies. 
Lastly, Panel C presents countries ranked by the amount of private equity capital received as 
a percentage of a country's FDI inflow. U.S. is again on top of the list followed by Denmark, 
Germany, and South Korea. India ranks 8th, while China ranks much lower due to the large 
amount of FDI flowing into China. Figure 3 presents the time-series of the ratio of global 
private equity investments to global FDI inflows. It showcases the increasing importance of 
private equity investments as another source of international capital flows indicating the 
importance of studying global private equity investments as a channel for productivity 
spillovers. Overall, Table 1 shows that private equity has become global, and although U.S., 
U.K., and other big European countries are still big hubs for private equity investments, 
emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil also get a large portion of the total 
private equity capital invested globally. 
Table 2 provides the industry distribution of total private equity, buyout and venture 
capital invested globally between 1990 -- 2011. The technology sector received the highest 
amount of capital, followed by industrial goods and services, and health care. The technology 
sector received more venture capital than buyout ($133 billion versus $124 billion), while a 
very big portion of private equity capital invested in industrial goods and services is buyout 
(only 7% of total invested capital is venture capital). The health care sector received $168 
billion of private equity capital in total, with 40% of it being venture capital. In almost all the 
other sectors, buyout capital makes up more than 90\% of the investments with the exception 
of telecommunications where the share of venture capital is around 20%. Overall, Table 2 
exhibits that venture capital went more into R&D intensive sectors such as technology and 
health care, while buyout capital dominated most of the other sectors. 
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The data on industry performance variables come from Datastream's Global Equity 
Indices that provides accounting as well as market price data for different industries in 53 
countries classified based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), a classification 
scheme categorizing over 70,000 companies and 75,000 securities worldwide. The industry-
wide measures are calculated using data from financial statements of a sample of publicly 
listed companies whose stocks cover a minimum 75% of the total market capitalization in 
every country-industry each year. The private equity investment data is matched to the 
industry performance data at the country-industry-year level using the ICB classification. 
Additional country-level variables used in the analysis come from World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI), which are then matched to the other data by country and 
year. Country-level data on legal environment, namely quality of institutions and intellectual 
property rights, and level of innovative capacity come from World Economic Forum's Global 
Competitiveness Index database. The final matched dataset has around 11,000 country-
industry-year observations covering 48 countries and 19 industries. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the industry- and country-level variables. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A1. Over the sample period, industry-wide 
employment grew at 7% on average, while median employment growth is 2.4%. Labor 
productivity on average grows at 7%. These seem like high numbers for industry-wide 
employment and productivity growth, but note that the sample includes developing 
economies where industries can grow much more rapidly than mature economies like the 
U.S. Average (median) net profit margin growth is 0.8% (0.15%) for the sample. The 
average (median) growth for industry returns (annual change in the value of industry stock 
return index) is about 10% (12%). Panel B presents summary statistics for the country-level 
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variables. Average (median) GDP growth is 2.2% (2.5%) in the sample. Public market is a 
measure of the liquidity of a country's stock markets, measured as the total value of stocks 
traded as a percentage of GDP. The average (median) value of stocks traded is 48% (22%) of 
GDP for the sample. Similarly, credit market is a proxy for the credit market development of 
a country, measured by the total amount of credit given to the private sector as a percentage 
of GDP. Private sector credit is on average 80% of a country's GDP in the sample. 
The goal of this paper is to identify the impact of private equity investments on 
industry level employment growth, productivity growth, and profitability growth to identify 
spillovers from private equity-backed companies to the rest of the industry. In Table 4, I 
compare average and median employment growth, profitability growth and productivity 
growth, along with some other variables, in subsamples of country-industry-years. Columns 
1 and 2 of Panel A present mean (median) values for the subsamples created based on a 
private equity indicator which takes the value of 1 at time t if the country-industry received 
capital in that year, and 0 otherwise. Column 3 presents p-values for the mean (median) 
difference between these subsamples from a t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Average 
employment growth and profitability growth are both higher in country-industries with a 
private equity investment, while average labor productivity growth is higher in the subsample 
of country-industries that did not receive any private equity capital. The negative association 
with productivity growth might reflect that private equity companies choose less productive 
country-industries to invest where there is more room to grow. The average growth in capital 
expenditures, net debt and industry returns are not significantly different among the 
subsamples. Furthermore, countries that received private equity capital seem to have more 
developed stock and credit markets, while having slower GDP growth on average. These 
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country characteristics suggest that private equity capital flows more into developed 
countries, which typically have slower output growth and more developed financial markets. 
This is consistent with the U.S. and U.K. receiving high amounts of capital and might be due 
to the availability of better exit opportunities for the private equity companies in those 
countries. 
Next, I limit the sample to country-industry-years with positive amounts of private 
equity capital invested, and compare means among subsamples of high versus low 
investments. Results are presented in Columns 4, 5 and 6 in a similar fashion. Several of the 
results are similar to the earlier comparison. Country-industries that received higher amounts 
of private equity capital have faster growth in employment and profitability on average at the 
time of investment, and the differences are larger in magnitude. Capital expenditure growth 
is not statistically different among the subsamples, as in the earlier comparison. Some results 
however are different from the conclusions drawn from the comparison of country-industries 
with and without any investment. Labor productivity grows faster for country-industries 
receiving higher amounts of investments, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Industries that receive higher amounts of private equity capital have higher industry returns, 
and debt growth. 
Overall a couple of conclusions can be made from the univariate comparisons. 
Industries that receive private equity capital have higher employment and profitability 
growth than industries that did not, and among the industries that received investment, the 
ones with higher amounts of capital experience faster growth. Labor productivity growth 
seems to be lower in industries with private equity investments, but among the industries 
with private equity investments, there is no statistically significant difference. Industry stock 
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returns seem not to matter as for whether there is any private equity investment or not, 
however among the industries with private equity investments, more capital is associated 
with higher stock returns at time of investment. 
These results suggest a positive relationship with the level of private equity capital invested 
in an industry and employment growth as well as profitability growth and industry stock 
returns. The relationship of private equity with productivity growth, on the other hand, seems 
to be ambiguous. 
Although these results are suggestive, it is very hard to make any conclusions about 
the actual relationship between private equity and industry performance given the potential 
endogeneity stemming from reverse causality: the decision of private equity companies to 
invest in a specific industry in a specific country is most likely endogenous. So, even though 
a multivariate analysis would allow to include additional controls, naive OLS regressions 
would also be limited to determine the impact of private equity on industry performance. 
Considering the endogeneity, a natural experiment or a good outside instrument for 
the amount of private equity capital would be the ideal case to identify the causal impact of 
private equity on industry dynamics. Unfortunately, neither natural experiments nor good 
instruments are easy to come up with in this circumstance. Thus, in the absence of these I 
make use of the time-series component of my data, and in an attempt to unravel the direction 
of causality, I apply a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model on the panel of country-
industry-years. Next section discusses the panel VAR approach. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
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A VAR is a system consisting of N linear equations with N variables where each variable is 
explained by its own lagged values together with the current and past values of the remaining 
N - 1 variables in the system. After being introduced by Sims (1980), it has been widely used 
to explain the dynamic behavior of multivariate economic and financial time-series. The 
main advantage of this estimation methodology is that it treats all the variables in the system 
as endogenous which leads to a better identification of the dynamic relationships between the 
variables in the system. In the absence of exogenous instruments, a VAR estimation is useful 
to deal with endogeneity as it uses lagged values of the variables as instruments. 
Although the VAR approach is long-established, it has not been widely used on panel data 
until recently. Love and Zicchino (2006) apply a VAR model on firm-level panel data from 
36 countries in their study of the dynamic investment behavior of firms in an attempt to 
isolate the impact of financial factors from fundamental factors that affect firm investment. I 
follow their empirical methodology and apply a VAR on the panel of country-industry data 
from 48 countries in the period of 1990 - 2011. In addition to utilizing the time-series 
component of the data treating the variables in the system as endogenous, the panel VAR 
also allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity by including country-industry fixed 
effects in the estimation. More specifically, following Love and Zicchino (2006), I estimate a 
panel VAR system of the following form: 
                                   ,  (1) 
where 
Xci,t : a three or four variable vector consisting of industry-level variables together with a 
measure of private equity capital invested 
μci : country-industry fixed effects 
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τt : time fixed effects. 
Country-industry fixed effects are included to control for any unobserved time-
invariant individual heterogeneity in the variables. In a single model specification, fixed 
effects may be removed by demeaning all the variables in the model at the individual 
observation level, which would be country-industry in this case. However, in this type of 
VAR specification, where all variables are instrumented by their lagged values, fixed effects 
when introduced by demeaning would be correlated with the regressors violating the 
exclusion restriction of the instruments. To overcome this problem, I apply a forward-mean 
differencing, also known as the “Helmert” procedure (Arellano and Bover, 1995), where only 
the forward-mean for every country-industry-year is removed. After the Helmert 
transformation, the model is then estimated using a system GMM where lagged values of the 
regressors are used as instruments. The specification also includes time-fixed effects to 
remove the effect of global macro shocks that might affect all the variables in the system. 
In a VAR specification, the ordering of the variables in the estimation does matter. 
The assumption is that every variable in the system affects the subsequent variables both 
contemporaneously and with a lag, while later variables affect the previous ones only with a 
lag. In other words, variables that appear earlier in the ordering are assumed to be more 
endogenous. In the estimations throughout the paper, I assume that private equity capital 
invested affects the industry variables both contemporaneously and with a lag, while it is 
impacted only with a lag.
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The goal of the panel VAR methodology is to identify the direction of causality 
between private equity capital invested in an industry and industry growth in terms of 
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 This assumption may not always hold; however, I repeat all the analysis with different orderings of the 
variables and all the results stay the same, and are available upon request. 
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employment, productivity, and profitability. It should be noted that as the industry measures 
are aggregated from publicly listed companies in an industry, the effect that will be identified 
would be a measure of spillovers from private equity-backed companies to the rest of the 
industry.
 
 
4. Results 
In this section, I estimate a panel VAR as in equation 1, where the X vector includes the 
amount of private equity capital invested in an industry adjusted by industry sales, industry-
wide employment growth, profitability growth and labor productivity growth. I am trying to 
identify what the impact of private equity capital is on the growth in employment, 
productivity and profitability of the public firms in an industry in an attempt to measure 
technology and productivity spillovers from private equity backed-companies to the rest of 
the industry. 
 
4.1 Private Equity and the Real Economy 
4.1.1 Private Equity, Employment, Productivity and Profitability    
Most likely, employment, labor productivity and profitability are jointly determined in an 
industry, and private equity companies observe past performance of an industry when 
deciding whether or not they should make an investment. As such, all the variables are 
endogenous. The VAR model allows me to cleanly identify the direction of causality 
between my variable of interest, private equity capital invested, and the other variables in the 
system to the extent that the amount of private equity capital invested in a country-industry is 
exogenous after controlling for lagged values of industry performance in that country. If the 
private equity companies bring in new technologies and management practices that lead to 
improvements at the target companies, and the rest of the companies within the same 
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industry absorb the resulting spillovers, we should observe a positive impact on industry 
prospects. Whether one should be concerned about reverse causality or not depends on if 
private equity capital invested is related to the past values of industry performance variables 
or not.
23
 Table 5 presents the results of the panel VAR estimation. The coefficients are from 
the system GMM estimation where all the variables at time t are regressed on their own lag 
together with the lags of the other variables in the model.
24
 The first column shows how the 
amount of private equity capital invested at time t is affected by employment growth, 
profitability growth and productivity growth at time t-1. All the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant with the exception of the variable's own lag, suggesting that private equity 
capital invested is not affected by how the industry did a year ago in terms of employment, 
profitability, and labor productivity growth, after controlling for the amount of capital 
invested at time t-1 and removing country-industry, and time fixed effects. The significant 
coefficient on the amount of private equity capital at time t-1 suggests that private equity 
capital is persistent, which is not surprising given the fact that private equity investments are 
typically completed in rounds. 
The second column presents the results from the part of the estimation where the 
dependent variable is employment growth. Employment growth at time t is significantly 
affected by productivity growth, and profitability growth at time t-1. After an industry 
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 Reverse causality might also be stemming from private equity companies' predictions about the industry 
prospects. However, the cross-sectional evidence presented in Section 5.4 is consistent with a causal effect of 
private equity on industry spillovers, while an explanation of superior foresight would not have the same 
cross-sectional predictions. 
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 Although the paper provides results with a one-year lag VAR only, results do not change when estimating 
VARs with two- or three-year lags. Existing statistical tests for the optimal number of lags cannot be applied to 
panel data. However, a likelihood ratio test between models with one, two and three lags indicates that the 
models with two or three lags do not fit significantly better than the model with one lag. Furthermore, 
Cochrane (2005) suggests that economic theory does not say much about the orders of autoregression terms, 
and short order auto-regressions should be used to approximate for processes. 
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experiences faster growth in profitability and higher productivity, it also grows faster in 
terms of employment subsequently. The main variable of interest for the purpose of this 
paper is private equity capital invested. It indeed also has a significant and positive 
coefficient: industries that receive more private equity capital experience faster employment 
growth following the investment. As there are country-industry fixed effects in the 
estimation, any unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity is removed. Basically, this result 
says that on average employment in a country-industry grows faster following a private 
equity capital investment compared to the level of employment growth in the same country-
industry in a year with no or limited private equity investment. Recall that employment 
growth is total employment growth of the public companies, which most likely do not 
receive private equity investment, in the industry. As such, note that the effect being 
measured is the spillover effect. As the private equity-backed companies become more 
efficient, the other companies within the same industry are also forced to improve their 
operations as well in order to be able to compete, and hence they create more jobs resulting 
faster growth in industry-wide employment. 
The third column shows how labor productivity changes following a private equity 
investment into the industry controlling for changes in employment and profitability together 
with the growth in labor productivity from the previous year. Lagged employment and 
profitability growth are not statistically significant. The coefficient on the amount of private 
equity capital invested, however, is again positive and significant at 1% showing that overall 
industry productivity grows faster following the flow of private equity capital into a part of 
the industry. So, not only employment, but also labor productivity grows faster subsequent to 
private equity companies investing in an industry. As in the example of the Hertz buyout, 
28 
 
private equity companies introduce practices and technologies that increase operational 
efficiency of their portfolio companies, and these efficiency gains spill over within the whole 
industry leading to higher productivity in the rest of the industry as well. 
Lastly, I look at how profitability changes. While the second and third columns have 
shown the positive impact of private equity on labor productivity and employment growth, 
they did not provide any evidence about the cost effectiveness of these improvements in an 
industry. The higher growth in labor productivity suggests an increase in sales, but does not 
show that this increase in sales is captured by higher profits. For example, if sales per 
employee increases because employees put more work hours and are therefore being 
compensated more aggressively, or more sales are reached through the use of advanced 
technologies that are very costly to implement; profits may deteriorate as a result, which in 
turn may lead to lower firm values. As such, it is important to see how profitability changes 
as a response to the private equity investment within the industry.  
The fourth column presents these results. While neither lagged employment growth 
nor lagged productivity growth are significant after removing fixed effects and controlling 
for lagged profitability growth, the amount of private equity capital has again a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient: after an industry receives private equity investment, 
profitability grows faster in comparison to years with no or low private equity capital.
25
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 One might be concerned that profit margins increase due to a reduction in sales as profitability is measured 
as net profits over sales. However, I find that sales growth increases as well indicating that the increase in 
profitability results from higher sales and lower costs. Section 5.5 shows that buyout transactions lead to 
higher leverage levels within the industry suggesting that tax benefits from higher leverage is another factor 
leading to higher profitability. 
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This result indicates that the gains in productivity and growth in employment are also 
reflected in profits.
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Overall, the results in Table 5 show that following private equity investments into an 
industry, public companies within the same industry that do not receive investment 
experience higher employment, productivity and profitability. These results suggest that after 
some companies in an industry receive private equity investment and become more efficient, 
other companies within the same industry are also forced to improve. This might be resulting 
from the competitive pressure from the private-equity backed companies as well as from 
copying of the best practices implemented by the private equity companies. Although not 
perfect, the panel VAR method controls for reverse causality to the extent that private equity 
companies make their decisions about investing in a particular industry based on what 
happened in the industry in the past. Past industry performance is not related to the amount of 
private equity capital invested into the industry suggesting a causal effect where private 
equity investments lead to spillovers within industries. 
One caveat should be noted about these results. Although I provide evidence for 
overall gains across the public companies within an industry, there is no direct evidence on 
firm-level performance. However, the reported results indicate that private equity 
investments create positive externalities within an industry. As such, the gains at the rest of 
the industry suggest that private-equity backing leads to efficiency gains at the target 
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 It is hard to tell if the spillover effects documented here are small or large since there is no benchmark to 
compare them to. However, they are comparable in magnitude to the effects found in Bernstein et al. (2012), 
the only other study looking at industry-level changes. It should be noted that their industry measures include 
the companies that actually receive private equity investment as well, while I am only looking at changes in 
public companies within the same industry. Hence, one would expect their results to be larger in magnitude. 
However, they do not observe the amount of actual capital invested and use only an indicator variable for the 
existence of any private equity transaction, which makes it harder to compare their results to the magnitudes 
documented here. 
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company first, which then are also absorbed by the other companies within the same 
industry. Hence, this is consistent with the existing literature that has shown that private 
equity leads to performance gains at the target companies. Kaplan (1989) and recently Guo et 
al. (2011) both have shown that profitability increases after buyouts. Furthermore, 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and Davis et al. (2009) provided evidence for productivity 
gains following buyouts. The higher growth in industry-level productivity and profitability 
confirm the findings of the aforementioned studies.
27
 These findings also complement the 
large body of studies that have provided evidence for positive spillovers from foreign owned 
companies onto local industries (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Given the increased share of 
private equity investments when compared to FDI as shown in Figure 3, it is important for 
policy makers to consider private equity investments as an alternative source of productivity 
and technology spillovers. Additionally, spillover effects within an industry and how the 
overall industry, rather than an individual company, fares from private equity investments 
should be taken into account when assessing the impact of private equity on the real 
economy, and making policy decisions about promoting or limiting private equity capital. 
 
4.1.2 Buyout versus Venture Capital 
While the previous section has shown that private equity capital leads to performance gains 
within the industry it is invested in, it did not differentiate between the two main asset classes 
of private equity, buyout and venture capital. A buyout transaction is where the private equity 
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 The existing evidence on firm-level performance gains range from 10% to 40% depending on the study and 
the measure of operating performance used. The economic magnitudes of the positive effects presented here 
are significantly smaller than firm-level effects, which is plausible given that what is being captured here are 
spillover effects only. The effects become larger when looking at a two- or three-year window, but are still 
significantly smaller than the documented firm-level effects. 
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firm typically acquires a target firm by purchasing all of the outstanding equity, often with a 
significant amount of debt financing. The typical buyout transaction is financed with 60 to 
90% debt (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Leveraged buyouts first appeared in early 1980s, 
almost disappeared in 1990s, but then reemerged in mid-2000s. Although buyouts are 
typically criticized for loading up the target companies with leverage, as well as cutting jobs 
and capital expenditures in an attempt to cut costs and increase profits, the existing evidence 
shows that they make their targets more efficient. Higher levels of debt, and better incentive 
structures put pressure on the managers to perform better; and together with stronger 
corporate governance, buyouts lead to efficiency gains. 
On the other hand, a typical venture capital transaction is an investment into a young 
and new company without acquiring majority control. Venture capital investments typically 
provide financing for small businesses that otherwise cannot get financing due to high 
informational asymmetries. As such, venture capital prevents young companies from having 
to forgo positive investment opportunities. Additionally, venture capital investments are 
typically associated with an increase in the target company's innovative potential by allowing 
for more research and development investments. Kortum and Lerner (2000) provide evidence 
that venture capital investments indeed spur innovation, and this result is replicated in many 
other studies using U.S. and European data.
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Given the very different structures of these two transactions, they might also differ in 
terms of their impact on industry dynamics. To explore if buyout and venture capital have 
different impacts on industry dynamics, I repeat the panel VAR analysis from Table 5, but 
separately for buyout and venture capital. Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 present the results 
with buyout and venture capital, respectively. The results in Panel A indicate that the earlier 
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 For example, Popov and Roosenboom (2012). 
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results about the impact of total private equity capital invested on industry employment and 
profitability are replicated when using buyout capital only. So, buyout capital invested in an 
industry leads to higher employment and profitability growth. I do not find any evidence in 
line with the critics arguing that buyout transactions lead to job cuts, at least at the industry 
level. As for productivity, I do not find evidence for faster growth after buyout transactions. 
This suggests that buyout transactions lead to improvements in profitability through cutting 
costs and financial engineering, but their impact on labor productivity is not significant.
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Panel B presents the results with venture capital. The first thing to note is that the coefficient 
on lagged private equity is larger for venture capital suggesting that venture capital is more 
persistent than buyout investments. The impact of venture capital invested on employment 
growth and profitability growth is not statistically different from zero. So, unlike buyouts, I 
do not find evidence for profitability gains or faster employment growth resulting from 
venture capital investments into an industry. Industry-level labor productivity, on the other 
hand, grows significantly faster following a venture capital investment. The finding that 
profitability does not increase following venture capital investments, despite the significant 
increase in productivity, might be due to costly investments in new technologies that lead to 
higher innovation. The result that venture capital does not lead to higher employment might 
be the result of a crowding out effect. Companies receiving venture capital create new 
technologies, which initially might crowd out the existing businesses and lead to employment 
declines. So, while new businesses are created, employment at existing businesses might 
decline at the same time mitigating the positive effect on overall industry employment, at 
least in a one-year window. 
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 This could be interpreted as buyouts leading to higher profits by cutting costs, but not through increases in 
sales. This would be consistent with buyouts adding value through financial engineering, where high levels of 
leverage lead to tax benefits as well as discipline managers with the pressure of making interest payments. 
33 
 
Venture capitalists typically make investments into small companies that are very 
research and development intensive and have high growth opportunities, but cannot get 
financing through other means as they are small and young. In that sense, venture capital 
investments are more aimed to eliminate financing constraints of the target companies. 
Therefore, in the short-term there are no employment or profitability spillovers onto the rest 
of the industry. Nonetheless, if venture capital leads to innovation and productivity 
spillovers, it in the longer-term should also lead to higher profitability and employment 
growth. In untabulated panel VAR's with 2- and 3-year lags I find that it is indeed the case. 
The amount of venture capital invested at time t-2 and t-3 leads to higher employment 
growth as well as higher profitability at time t. This supports the argument that venture 
capital facilitates innovation of new technologies that lead to productivity spillovers, but are 
not immediately reflected in higher profits or employment. However, in the longer-term both 
profitability and employment grow faster following venture capital investments in an 
industry.
30
  
To summarize, while buyout investments can quickly lead to an increase in profits by 
utilizing financial engineering skills, a longer time is needed for the increased productivity to 
be reflected in higher profits and employment growth after venture capital investments. The 
lack of significant productivity spillovers from buyouts suggests that the operational and 
financial improvements introduced by private equity companies in buyout transactions are 
more focused at reducing costs and increasing profits, but do not necessarily lead to higher 
sales growth. The large impact of venture capital on productivity growth is consistent with 
                                                          
30
 The effect of twice-lagged venture capital invested on profitability growth is larger in magnitude than the 
effect of lagged buyout capital invested. While a one standard deviation increase in lagged buyout invested 
leads to a 1.8% increase in profitability growth, a one standard deviation increase in twice-lagged venture 
capital invested leads to a 6% increase in profitability growth. 
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the existing evidence on venture capital that has shown a positive relationship between 
venture capital and subsequent innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Mollica and Zingales, 
2007). It is also consistent with the recent study of Gonzales-Uribe (2012), which shows that 
venture capitalists spur innovation through a better diffusion of knowledge. Furthermore, the 
larger effect on industry productivity might also be related to the absorptive capacity of the 
industries receiving venture capital investment. Venture capital investments are made more 
into high R&D industries, which are shown to better absorb spillovers due to higher levels of 
technical knowledge and human capital in the FDI spillovers literature (Kogut and Chang, 
1991). 
 
4.1.3 Private Equity and Investment 
Some of the existing studies have found that private equity companies lead to a reduction in 
capital expenditures at the portfolio companies (Kaplan 1989). While this might cut costs and 
increase profitability in the short-run, it raises concerns about future cash-flows being 
sacrificed for short-term operational gains. While it is an important concern, studies looking 
at stock market performance of private equity-backed companies that are taken public 
provide evidence for superior returns, which indirectly suggests that long-run prospects are 
not hurt. In line with this argument, I estimate a panel VAR similar to Love and Zicchino 
(2006) to examine how industry-level investment is affected by private equity. Indeed, I put 
growth in free cash flow, growth in capital expenditures, growth in market-to-book, and the 
private equity measure into the same system of equations to detect the dynamic relationship 
between industry-level investment and private equity. Free cash flow is included to control 
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for the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal financing, while market-to-
book is used as a proxy for investment opportunities. 
Table 7 presents the results. The first column shows that the amount of private equity 
capital is not related to past values of cash flow, capital expenditure, and market-to-book 
growth, while the result about the persistence of private equity capital still holds. The second 
column shows that growth in free cash flows at time t is not related to private equity 
investments and capital expenditures at time t-1 after controlling for cash flow growth at time 
t-1 together with country-industry and year fixed effects. 
The result on the impact of private equity capital on industry investment is provided 
in the third column. As expected, I find that capital expenditures grow faster following 
private equity investments within an industry. This finding suggests that technology 
spillovers resulting from private equity companies lead to faster growth in capital 
expenditures at externality-receiving firms. To keep up with the new technologies and 
efficiency gains at the private equity-backed firms, the rest of the industry increases capital 
expenditures which would potentially lead to overall industry growth in the long-run. As 
expected, lagged cash flow growth is also found to be positively related to capital 
expenditure growth suggesting that availability of internal financing facilitates investment as 
found in earlier studies about cash-flow sensitivity of investment. Furthermore, capital 
expenditure growth is also related to past values of market-to-book showing that investment 
increases in response to higher investment opportunities. 
Despite the existing evidence on the negative impact of private equity on capital 
expenditures at the firm-level, I find that capital expenditures increase subsequent to private 
equity investments. This finding is important as it suggests that even if capital expenditures 
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are cut at target companies for cost reduction purposes, other companies within the same 
industry increase capital expenditures to compete with the private equity-backed firms. As 
such, the increased level of investment in the industry will facilitate overall industry growth. 
This finding also supports the study by Harford and Kolasinski (2012), which finds that 
private equity transactions do not lead to underinvestment at the target companies, as well as 
Lerner et al. (2008) which provides evidence on increased portfolio company patent 
productivity as an example of long-run investment after buyout transactions. 
 
4.2 Spillovers across Countries and Industries 
The results so far suggest that there are productivity spillovers from private equity-backed 
companies in an industry to the public firms within the same industry. How much 
improvement private equity companies provide for their portfolio companies and how well 
the resulting positive externalities in turn are absorbed by the other firms within the same 
industry might be different depending on the characteristics of the country as well as the 
industry. In this section, I explore the cross-section of countries and industries to investigate 
where the spillovers from private equity-backed companies are most effective. 
 
4.2.1 Spillovers from Private Equity Conditional on Legal Strength 
Starting with the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) that studies the interaction of law and 
finance, many studies have examined the relationship between the legal environment, 
financial development and growth of a country. Regarding private equity investments, Lerner 
and Schoar (2005) have shown that the legal origin and level of law enforcement affect the 
type and value of private equity transactions. One could argue that in countries with a weaker 
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legal endowment, private equity companies can add value by mitigating contractual 
shortcomings with private contracting; however, the study by Balcarcel et al. (2012) show 
that reliability in the legal environment limits the flow of private equity capital into countries 
with less developed legal systems at the first place. So, although private equity might be 
more beneficial to countries with weaker legal institutions, the weak legal environment 
discourages private equity investment.
31
 Governance engineering is one of the main channels 
private equity companies add value at the portfolio companies. Cumming and Walz (2009) 
find that private equity companies have higher returns in countries with stronger legal 
conditions and conclude that external corporate governance mechanisms are necessary for 
private equity companies to implement more efficient governance structures at the firm level. 
Furthermore, Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) discuss that efficient regulations and institutions 
in a country might lead to higher spillovers from multinational corporations onto local 
companies, but they also note that there is not enough evidence to make a clear conclusion 
about the issue. In one of the fewer studies on this, Mansfield (1994) finds that the strength 
of a country's intellectual property protection has a significant effect on FDI flows as well as 
on the extent of technology transferred from U.S. firms to their foreign affiliates. This would 
suggest that the implementation of new technologies and practices might be stronger in 
countries with stronger intellectual property rights. 
Based on these arguments, I predict that the positive impacts documented earlier 
should be more pronounced in countries with stronger legal institutions as well as better 
intellectual property protection. To find out if it is indeed the case and examine how the legal 
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 More importantly, a weak legal environment would limit the implementation of technologies and practices 
that add value at the portfolio companies and lead to spillovers onto the other companies within the same 
industry. 
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environment impacts the effectiveness of private equity companies' impact on industry 
dynamics, I explore the cross-section of countries by applying the panel VAR on subsamples. 
I create subsamples based on a measure of the quality of legal institutions, and a measure of 
intellectual property rights from the global competitiveness index created by the World 
Economic Forum.
32
  
The results are presented in Table 8.
33
 Panel A-B and C-D present the results for 
countries with weak versus strong institutional quality and intellectual property rights, 
respectively. The results show that the effects are more pronounced for the subsamples of 
countries with stronger legal institutions and intellectual property rights. This indicates the 
importance of a country's legal environment for private equity companies to facilitate 
efficiency gains at their portfolio companies and create spillovers within the industry. 
 
4.2.2 Spillovers from Private Equity Conditional on Innovative Capacity 
Once positive externalities are created within an industry, it is also very important whether 
the local companies are going to be capable of absorbing the spillovers. The long-established 
literature on convergence in development economics argues that less developed economies 
will grow faster since they have less diminishing returns to capital, and in the long-run, they 
will catch-up with developed economies (Barro, 1997).
34
 In line with the catching-up theory, 
countries, where initial inefficiencies are higher and skills are in shorter supply, would be in 
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 Institutional quality index combines information on the judicial efficiency, law enforcement, corruption, 
investor protection, and reporting standards in a country. 
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 For brevity, I only present the results for the private equity variable (the first row from Table 5); however, 
the estimation is identical to the earlier panel VAR. All the other results are identical: none of the industry 
variables at time t-1 are related to the amount of private equity capital invested at time t mitigating concerns 
about reverse causality. 
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 For example, Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) show that the entrance of U.S. corporations into Mexico leads to 
a convergence in productivity levels of local Mexican firms and U.S. firms. 
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greater need of the practices and technologies introduced by the private equity companies. 
Hence, industries in countries with lower technology levels might benefit more from the 
entrance of private equity capital. On the other hand, productivity spillovers might not take 
place in countries where starting technology levels are too low, because such companies 
might be unable to provide a competitive response to private equity-backed companies, and 
private equity may lead to a crowding out of existing firms. Several studies have provided 
evidence on this issue suggesting that a very high level of technological gap between the 
home country of multinational corporations and the host country indeed lead to smaller 
spillover effects. For example, Kokko et al. (1996) find that spillovers are only absorbed by 
companies that have moderate technology gaps with foreign firms.
35
 
To study the spillovers from private equity investments in countries with different 
levels of technological advancement levels, I repeat the panel VAR in subsamples of 
countries created based on a measure of innovative capacity. The innovative capacity score 
comes from the global competitiveness index created by the World Economic Forum. 
Table 9 presents the results. Panel A and B present the results for the subsamples of 
countries with very low and very high innovative capacity scores, respectively. Panel C 
presents the results for the rest of the countries, which have moderate levels of innovative 
capacities. As predicted, the positive impacts of private equity investments on industry 
growth are only present for the countries with moderate levels of innovative capacities. There 
is no statistically significant relationship between the private equity capital invested and 
industry growth for countries with the highest or lowest levels of innovative capacities. These 
results are consistent with the existing evidence showing that spillovers cannot be absorbed if 
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 Haddad and Harrison (1991), Cantwell (1989), and Kokko (1994) also find similar results. 
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the companies are too far away from the technological level introduced by the foreign 
companies.
36
 
 
4.2.3 Spillovers from Private Equity Conditional on Competitiveness 
Lastly, I explore the cross-section of country-industries based on the level of competition 
within a country-industry. The results so far have shown that private equity investments in an 
industry lead to higher profitability, employment and productivity at the public companies 
within the same industry. The spillovers onto the other companies might result from copying 
of best practices and technologies as well as from the competitive pressure coming from the 
more efficient private equity-backed companies. Hence, the level of competition in the 
industry might affect the extent of spillovers. As in the example of the Hertz buyout, the 
spillover effects are expected to be higher in competitive industries, where the efficiency 
gains at a private equity-backed company would put a high pressure on the other companies 
to become more efficient as well. I investigate this in Table 10. It presents the main panel 
VAR results on subsamples of country-industries with high versus low levels of competition. 
Industry-level gross margins are used as a proxy for the level of competition with the idea 
that higher margins can be charged in less competitive industries. The positive impacts on 
employment, productivity and profitability are concentrated in country-industries with higher 
levels of competition suggesting that the competitive pressure within an industry is indeed an 
important factor leading to spillovers. 
Overall, the cross-sectional findings in this section indicate that the positive impacts 
of private equity capital on industry dynamics are limited to a group of countries and 
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 The results are identical when I use technological readiness score from the global competitiveness index as 
the proxy for the absorptive capacity of a country. 
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industries with specific characteristics. Two main conclusions can be made from the cross-
country analysis. First, stronger legal institutions are needed for the positive spillovers to be 
created by the private equity companies. Second, the spillover effects are most effective in 
countries with moderate levels of technological development as these countries are not only 
still in need of the new practices and technologies introduced by the private equity 
companies, but also have the sufficient level of starting technological development that 
enables them to absorb the spillovers. I also investigate if the level of competition has an 
impact on the effect of spillovers and find that the positive impacts of private equity 
investments are concentrated in more competitive country-industries suggesting that the 
competitive pressure is an important channel for spillovers. 
Besides providing evidence consistent with the existing literature on spillovers, the 
results in this section also provide support for a causal effect of private equity investments on 
industry dynamics. All the cross-sectional results are consistent with the argument that 
private equity companies lead to positive externalities and spillovers within the industry, 
which are reflected in higher employment, profitability and productivity growth. It is hard to 
come up with other explanations that would have the same predictions about the results for 
the cross-section of countries and industries, other than the causal link from private equity 
investments to industry spillovers. 
 
4.3 Private Equity and the Financial Economy 
The analysis so far has focused on how the real side of the economy is affected by private 
equity exploring changes in industry dynamics subsequent to private equity investments. In 
this section, I study the impact of private equity capital on two financial variables: leverage 
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and stock returns. In buyout transactions, private equity companies typically buy their target 
companies with high levels of debt, which might lead to higher financial distress costs and 
bankruptcy.
37
 On the other hand, higher leverage can also be a source of value creation at the 
target companies by providing better incentives for management as well as tax benefits. 
Jenkinson and Stucke (2011) find that leveraged buyouts generate significant value by higher 
tax shields. Similarly, Guo et al. (2011) argue that about 30% of returns of private equity 
transactions are due to the tax benefits of higher leverage. Thus, it is important to examine 
the implication of buyout capital for the overall debt level of an industry. 
Additionally, the evidence so far has provided evidence for industry-wide 
performance improvements following private equity investments. However, it is not shown 
what the implications are for share values. If these improvements are reflected in investor 
beliefs, we should observe a positive association between industry returns and the amount of 
private equity capital invested. A line of the private equity literature has provided evidence 
that private equity companies chase returns, i.e. they invest into industries/companies that 
recently had high stock market returns. Hence, the same concerns about identifying which 
way the direction of causality goes between private equity capital invested and stock market 
returns still applies. 
I estimate a panel VAR model with the amount of private equity invested, growth in 
industry-wide debt, and growth in the value of industry return index to examine the dynamic 
relationship between private equity and the two financial variables. Table 11 presents the 
results of the estimation of the system with GMM. Panel A and B have the results for buyout 
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 The existing evidence on this issue is mixed. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find that 23% of large public to 
private transactions defaulted during the 1980s. Kaplan and Stromberg (2009), on the other hand, find that 
the average default rate of leveraged buyouts is lower than the average default rate for all U.S. corporate 
bond issuers. 
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and venture capital, respectively. The first columns of Panel A (B) show that the amount of 
buyout (venture) capital invested at time t is not related to debt growth at time t-1. The 
insignificant coefficient on lagged industry returns in the first columns of both panels 
contradicts the existing evidence that private equity companies chase returns and eliminates 
concerns about reverse causality. 
The second column in Panel A shows that buyout capital leads to higher growth in 
industry-wide debt and concerns about reverse causality are again eliminated as per the first 
column. This result is not surprising given the fact that private equity companies finance 
buyout transactions with high levels of debt. High levels of debt at the private equity-backed 
companies force the other companies in the industry to lever up as well, and hence industry-
wide debt grows faster following the private equity investment.
38
 Although higher debt levels 
would create value through tax shields, it is hard to make any arguments about the overall 
impact without having information on the risk associated with financial distress and 
bankruptcy at the industry. However, assuming that adverse effects of bankruptcy costs 
would be reflected in stock prices, looking at stock returns would be suggestive. The third 
column in Panel A indeed shows that buyout investments in an industry lead to lower stock 
values. This result indicates that the increased debt levels in the industry are not welcomed 
by the investors leading to lower valuations.
39
 The second column of Panel B shows that 
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 Another interpretation of the increase in debt levels could be that the inflow of private equity capital into an 
country-industry is correlated with other capital flows, which would make debt financing cheaper and lead to 
higher debt within the industry. However, that would suggest the same increase after venture capital 
transactions as well, which is not the case as Panel B shows. 
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 This is surprising given the earlier results about industry-wide improvements in real performance. To see 
if/when the gains in operating performance are reflected in stock values, I repeat the panel VAR with 2- and 3-
year lags. Stock values are also negatively impacted by the amount of buyout capital invested at time t-2, 
while they are positively related to the amount of buyout capital at time t-3. This suggests that investors 
initially dislike the inflow of buyout capital into the industry, which leads to lower stock values; however, the 
improvements in operating performance are later reflected in higher stock values. 
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there is no significant relationship between the amount of venture capital invested, and 
industry debt. The third column of Panel B, however, shows that there is a positive impact of 
venture capital on industry stock returns suggesting that investors positively respond to the 
entrance of venture capital into an industry. This result shows that the productivity spillovers 
from private equity-backed companies to the other companies within the same industry also 
have implications on firm value, for the case of venture capital. However, it should be noted 
that I am looking at raw, not risk-adjusted, returns. If venture capital investments make the 
industry riskier, the increased returns might be the result of investors requiring higher returns 
for increased levels of risk.
40
 Hence, the return result should be interpreted with caution. 
Overall, two conclusions can be drawn from the results in this section. First, the high 
debt levels of private equity backed-companies in buyout transactions lead to an increase in 
debt levels in the industry as a whole. Assuming the increase in leverage moves the industries 
closer towards the optimal capital structure, this might be one of the channels that private 
equity companies add operational value. However, the negative relationship between buyout 
capital invested and stock returns suggests an adverse implication for share values. Second, 
the positive externalities created by the private equity companies in an industry do not only 
increase productivity, employment and profitability for public companies within the same 
industry, but also lead to higher stock values in the case of venture capital investments. 
Higher stock values indicate that the practices private equity companies implement to 
increase profits do not necessarily sacrifice long-term firm values. This finding expands the 
existing studies which have found evidence for superior stock market performance at private 
equity-backed companies that are taken public again (Cao and Lerner 2009) by providing 
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 Bernstein et al. (2012) provide evidence that industries with private equity transactions are not more 
exposed to aggregate shocks. 
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evidence that the value implications are not limited to the company receiving the investment, 
but also spill over within the industry.
41
 
 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
One concern about the findings of the paper would be a market-timing argument. One could 
argue that private equity companies have informational advantages and superior foresight 
about an industry's prospects. In that case, they would invest in a specific country-industry 
that they predict would grow, and that might be driving the results documented in this paper. 
The panel VAR controls for this to the extent that the expectations of the private equity 
companies about the industry growth are shaped by how the industry did in the past. 
However, it would be impossible to fully exclude an information story where the private 
equity companies have foresight and enter into an industry based on superior information as 
their expectations may not be perfectly correlated with the industry performance in the past. 
Nevertheless, the discussion in this section suggests that market-timing cannot be the only 
driver of the findings of the paper. First, it is not very clear how the private equity companies 
would have perfect foresight about an industry during the time of entry. It is plausible to 
think that the informational advantage of the private equity companies would be stronger 
during exits, when compared to the timing of entry, as they have been at the specific portfolio 
company for a longer period.
42
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 As a robustness check, I repeat the analysis in this section on Asian countries only, since private equity 
companies typically acquire minority stakes in those countries due to strict regulations. Indeed, the results are 
quite different. I find that there is no significant effect on industry debt growth, which indicates that the 
minority stake buyouts are not highly levered as regular buyouts. Consistent with that, I do not find that stock 
returns are lower; they indeed are higher after private equity investments in Asia. 
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 The average holding period of a portfolio company is typically 4-5years. 
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However, existing evidence suggests that private equity companies are not timing the market 
even when exiting a portfolio company (Ball et al. 2011). Given that there is very little 
evidence of timing for exists, it is even harder to think that they are perfectly timing the 
market when entering into an industry, which is when their informational advantages should 
be smaller. 
Second, suppose that they can perfectly time the market and invest into an industry 
when they think the industry is going to do well. This is consistent with the documented 
faster growth in employment, profitability and productivity. However, if they have superior 
foresight and are able to time the market industry stock returns also should be higher 
following their investments. The results in Table 11, nevertheless, show that stock returns are 
lower subsequent to buyout capital being invested in an industry. This is inconsistent with a 
market timing explanation, which would predict the market returns to go up if they were able 
to perfectly time the market. 
Third, the cross-sectional findings presented in Section 5.4 are all consistent with 
spillover effects from private equity-backed companies to the publicly listed firms within the 
same industry, while they are not with a market-timing explanation. I provide evidence that 
the results are concentrated in countries with a stronger legal environment and moderate 
levels of technological capacity, as well as in industries with a higher level of competition. It 
is hard to come up with these cross-sectional predictions when considering a market-timing 
hypothesis. Why would the private equity companies have informational advantages in 
countries with better legal institutions and be able to time the market, whereas they cannot do 
the same in other counties? If anything, it would be more plausible to think that informational 
advantages of the private equity companies should be stronger in countries with weaker legal 
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institutions where informational asymmetries are higher. This would predict that the positive 
effects should be more pronounced in countries with a weaker legal environment, while I 
find the opposite. Furthermore, the technological capacity result is also consistent with 
spillovers being most effective in places, where there is both some need for technological 
advancement and also some level of existing technological advancement that provides the 
capacity to absorb. It is again hard to think why private equity companies would be able to 
time the market in countries with a moderate level of technological capacity, but not in 
others. Lastly, spillovers are predicted to be stronger in more competitive industries as the 
competitive pressure from the more efficient private equity-backed companies forces the 
other companies to become more efficient as well. This is indeed what the results in Table 10 
present and it is again hard to explain why market timing would work for competitive 
country-industries, but not for others. While none of the above explanations would alone be 
sufficient to fully exclude a market timing hypothesis, when put together they support a 
causal effect where private equity investments lead to spillovers resulting in superior industry 
performance. 
One of the shortcomings of the Burgiss data is that its coverage is relatively weak 
before 1995 (Brown et al. 2012). So, one might be concerned that those years might bias the 
results in the paper. Nonetheless, all the results are identical when years before 1995, after 
which Burgiss' coverage is more comprehensive, are dropped from the sample. 
The results are also robust to a different aggregation of the industry level. When industry 
measures and private equity investments are aggregated at a broader level, which results in 9 
industries instead of 19, the results stay the same. This provides further support that market 
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timing is not the only driver of the results as it is less plausible to think that private equity 
companies are able to have perfect foresight for industries that are defined more broadly. 
Another concern might be that the spillovers cannot take place within a year, although the 
Hertz example showcases that they indeed can happen over a short period of time. To address 
this, I repeat the analysis in the paper using VAR's with two- and three-year lags. The main 
results do not change and the strongest effect is indeed in the first year following the private 
equity investment.
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As the U.S. and the U.K. receive a large portion of private equity capital invested, one 
might be concerned that the results in the paper are driven by these two countries only. 
Nevertheless, when I repeat all the analysis excluding the U.S. and the U.K., I find that all 
the main results stay the same. 
Lastly, the results are also robust to using different specifications instead of the VAR. 
Results are very similar when single equations with the industry growth variables as the 
dependent variable are separately estimated using pooled OLS. When estimating models with 
OLS, I also include a measure of exogenous growth opportunities, similar to Bekaert et al. 
2007, to control for the private equity companies' expectations about the country-industry's 
prospects. The measure is the world-wide price earnings ratio for an industry, which should 
capture growth options, including expectations about the future, for a specific industry in a 
country. The results stay the same when this measure is included in the specifications.
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 It should also be noted that a 1-year VAR will still have responses past 1 year by nature of how the systems 
are autoregressive, i.e. shocks will continue to propagate. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Private equity investments have risen dramatically during the last two decades as Figure 1 
shows; not only in developed countries but in developing countries as well. While 
researchers have explored how private equity firms impact their portfolio companies, it is 
surprising that there is no evidence on the implications of private equity for the economy as a 
whole. The well-established spillover literature in economics provides evidence that 
productivity spillovers exist within industries (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998), which I take as 
the motivation to explore spillovers from private equity-backed companies to the rest of the 
industry. Using a novel dataset on global private equity investments in 19 industries across 
48 countries, I study the impact of private equity on industry dynamics. By focusing on 
aggregate industry measures of publicly listed companies, I am able to identify the 
productivity spillovers from private equity-backed companies to the other companies within 
the same industry. 
The first part of the paper looks at the real economy. I find that employment growth, 
profitability growth, and labor productivity growth all increase across the public companies 
in an industry following private equity investments. Additionally, I find that industry-level 
capital expenditures grow faster as well. Considering the endogeneity of the decision of 
private equity companies to invest into a specific industry, I apply a panel VAR. While 
treating all the variables in the system as endogenous, the model also allows for fixed effects 
to control for individual heterogeneity at the country-industry level. Concerns about reverse 
causality, stemming from past industry performance affecting private equity investments, are 
eliminated as I do not find evidence that past values of industry dynamics are significantly
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 related to the amount of private equity capital a country-industry receives. The 
improvements in industry-level performance documented in this paper are consistent with an 
interpretation that the companies receiving private equity capital become more efficient and 
put pressure on the other companies within the same industry, which leads to overall 
performance gains among the public companies within the industry. As such, while providing 
novel evidence on industry spillovers from private equity onto industries, my findings are 
also consistent with the existing evidence on the impact of private equity on firm-level 
performance, which finds both profitability (Kaplan 1989, Smith 1990, Guo et al. 2011) and 
productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990, Davis et al. 2009) increases following buyout 
transactions. The finding that capital expenditures also increase suggests that private equity 
owners do not sacrifice long-term value for short-term profits, which is consistent with the 
results in Harford and Kolasinski (2012). 
Next, I examine how the effects of private equity on industry dynamics are different 
in the cross-section of countries and industries. I find that the impacts on industry growth are 
more pronounced in the subsample of countries with stronger institutions and intellectual 
property rights suggesting that private equity companies need a strong legal environment to 
be able to implement governance practices that lead to more efficient portfolio companies. I 
also find that the positive effects are concentrated in countries with moderate levels of 
innovative capacities. Countries with very high or very low levels of innovative capacities do 
not experience the spillovers from private equity investments as a very high level of 
innovative capacity means that there is less need for new technologies, whereas a very low 
level means that the technological gap is so big that spillovers cannot be absorbed. These 
results are largely consistent with the literature that examines spillovers from foreign direct 
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investments onto local industries and finds that companies with moderate levels of 
technological advancement are better absorbers of productivity spillovers (Khogut and Chang 
1991, Kokko 1994, Kokko et al. 1996). The spillover effects are also found to be 
concentrated in country-industries with higher levels of competition. Overall, the cross-
sectional results further indicate a causal effect where private equity investments lead to 
higher industry growth through spillovers, because it is hard to come up with alternative 
explanations that have similar cross-sectional predictions. 
Lastly, I investigate what the implications of private equity are for the financial 
economy. I find that debt levels increase in industries that recently received private equity 
capital, which suggests that financial structures used by the private equity firms also spill 
over within the industry causing other firms to lever up. This indicates that a more efficient 
capital structure is one of the main channels through which private equity firms add value at 
their portfolio companies. This is consistent with studies that have shown evidence for large 
gains from tax shields (Jenkinson and Stucke, 2011) as well as studies that have found that 
higher debt levels reduce agency problems and prevent overinvestment (Harford and 
Kolasinski, 2012). Additionally, I provide evidence that venture capital leads to higher 
industry stock returns suggesting that the spillovers from venture capital to the other firms 
within the same industry also lead to higher firm values. 
The findings of the paper are important as they provide evidence on the impact of 
private equity on industry dynamics, rather than individual companies, which is an 
unexplored area. The private equity industry has been criticized, especially by the popular 
press and labor unions, regarding their impact on the companies they invest in. By providing 
evidence on the positive externalities created by private equity investments within an 
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industry using a sample including both developed and developing countries, this paper 
presents a more complete picture about the implications of private equity for the global 
economy. In a time when the recent global financial crisis pushed policy makers to more 
closely look at financial institutions, including the private equity industry, this paper presents 
evidence for policy makers that are trying to decide whether to limit or promote private 
equity capital. Future research on this issue will more clearly show what the specific 
channels of spillovers from private equity are and how policy makers should react to enhance 
the positive impacts of private equity investments globally.
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Table 1: Private Equity Investments around the Globe 
This table presents the distribution of private equity capital invested among the 48 countries 
in the sample between 1990 and 2011. The first, second, and third columns show the total 
amount of private equity capital, buyout capital, and venture capital, respectively. Panel A 
presents the countries ranked by the total amount of capital received. Panel B presents the 
countries ranked by the total amount of capital received as a percentage of GDP. Panel C 
presents the countries ranked by the total amount of capital received as a percentage of FDI 
inflow to the country. Amounts in Panel A are in 2011 million dollars. Panel B and C report 
averages of the ratios across years. 
Panel A: Distribution of Private Equity Capital Invested Globally 
Country 
PE Capital      
Invested 
Buyout Capital 
Invested 
Venture Capital 
Invested 
United States 852,771 622,343 230,428 
United Kingdom 109,920 101,141 8,779 
Germany 43,905 40,981 2,924 
China 37,076 26,085 10,991 
France 33,921 31,939 1,982 
Italy 24,280 23,271 1,009 
India 22,675 18,410 4,265 
Netherlands 20,886 20,054 832 
Sweden 17,871 17,096 775 
Canada 17,771 14,513 3,258 
Spain 16,677 16,495 182 
Australia 15,620 15,033 587 
Japan 11,841 11,216 625 
Denmark 9,745 9,410 335 
Brazil 8,359 7,614 745 
South Korea 7,752 7,030 722 
Israel 6,076 2,978 3,098 
Norway 5,866 5,760 106 
Switzerland 5,745 5,147 598 
Hong Kong 5,227 4,533 694 
Singapore 4,700 4,155 545 
Argentina 4,506 4,481 25 
Ireland 4,462 4,009 453 
Belgium 4,329 4,086 243 
Russia 4,036 3,660 376 
Poland 3,557 3,106 451 
Indonesia 3,460 3,403 57 
Turkey 3,149 2,643 506 
South Africa 2,880 2,801 79 
Czech Republic 2,789 2,728 61 
Finland 2,722 2,629 93 
New Zealand 2,413 2,256 157 
Austria 2,248 1,195 1,053 
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Mexico 1,464 1,411 53 
Greece 1,306 1,305 1 
Hungary 1,266 1,197 69 
Thailand 863 789 74 
Romania 783 719 64 
Chile 734 624 110 
Bulgaria 729 586 143 
Portugal 681 681 0 
Colombia 614 185 429 
Egypt 481 442 39 
Philippines 451 415 36 
Malaysia 301 252 49 
Venezuela 189 189 0 
Slovenia 129 124 5 
Peru 26 23 3 
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Panel B: Private Equity Capital Received as a % of GDP 
Country 
PE Capital  
as a % of GDP 
Buyout Capital  
as a % of GDP 
Venture Capital  
as a % of GDP 
United States 0.360% 0.262% 0.098% 
United Kingdom 0.299% 0.274% 0.025% 
Sweden 0.278% 0.266% 0.012% 
Denmark 0.257% 0.248% 0.009% 
Netherlands 0.224% 0.215% 0.009% 
Ireland 0.185% 0.139% 0.046% 
Israel 0.185% 0.088% 0.096% 
Bulgaria 0.177% 0.142% 0.035% 
Singapore 0.171% 0.148% 0.023% 
Czech Republic 0.161% 0.157% 0.004% 
New Zealand 0.142% 0.139% 0.003% 
Norway 0.138% 0.136% 0.002% 
Australia 0.134% 0.128% 0.006% 
India 0.129% 0.106% 0.023% 
Spain 0.109% 0.108% 0.001% 
Hong Kong 0.107% 0.093% 0.014% 
France 0.106% 0.100% 0.006% 
Canada 0.100% 0.081% 0.019% 
Hungary 0.100% 0.094% 0.006% 
Germany 0.100% 0.093% 0.007% 
Italy 0.095% 0.091% 0.004% 
Switzerland 0.094% 0.084% 0.010% 
Finland 0.088% 0.085% 0.003% 
Belgium 0.078% 0.074% 0.004% 
South Africa 0.077% 0.075% 0.002% 
Poland 0.071% 0.060% 0.011% 
Argentina 0.071% 0.070% 0.001% 
Romania 0.069% 0.061% 0.008% 
China 0.064% 0.045% 0.019% 
Indonesia 0.062% 0.061% 0.001% 
South Korea 0.053% 0.048% 0.005% 
Austria 0.048% 0.026% 0.022% 
Brazil 0.046% 0.042% 0.004% 
Russia 0.045% 0.041% 0.004% 
Turkey 0.039% 0.033% 0.006% 
Greece 0.038% 0.038% 0.000% 
Chile 0.036% 0.032% 0.004% 
Thailand 0.027% 0.024% 0.003% 
Portugal 0.025% 0.025% 0.000% 
Slovenia 0.023% 0.022% 0.001% 
Philippines 0.023% 0.021% 0.002% 
Colombia 0.019% 0.006% 0.013% 
Egypt 0.015% 0.014% 0.001% 
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Malaysia 0.013% 0.010% 0.003% 
Mexico 0.011% 0.011% 0.000% 
Japan 0.011% 0.010% 0.001% 
Venezuela 0.007% 0.007% 0.000% 
Peru 0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 
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Panel C: Private Equity Capital Received as a % FDI Inflow 
Country 
PE Capital  
as a % of FDI 
Buyout Capital  
as a % of FDI 
Venture Capital  
as % of FDI 
United States 22.88% 16.61% 6.27% 
Denmark 12.53% 12.19% 0.34% 
Germany 10.42% 9.05% 1.37% 
South Korea 9.91% 9.28% 0.63% 
Netherlands 7.69% 7.59% 0.10% 
Finland 6.93% 6.87% 0.06% 
United Kingdom 6.63% 6.03% 0.60% 
India 5.35% 4.55% 0.80% 
Israel 5.21% 2.33% 2.88% 
South Africa 5.00% 4.93% 0.07% 
Greece 4.84% 4.84% 0.00% 
Italy 4.78% 4.48% 0.30% 
Sweden 4.66% 4.40% 0.26% 
Norway 4.03% 3.95% 0.08% 
Indonesia 3.64% 2.35% 0.99% 
New Zealand 3.00% 2.94% 0.06% 
Argentina 3.00% 2.96% 0.04% 
Czech Republic 2.97% 2.88% 0.09% 
Japan 2.95% 2.76% 0.19% 
Spain 2.56% 2.52% 0.04% 
France 2.53% 2.35% 0.18% 
Canada 2.30% 1.80% 0.50% 
Australia 2.26% 2.14% 0.12% 
Philippines 2.09% 1.98% 0.11% 
Switzerland 1.90% 1.73% 0.17% 
Austria 1.21% 0.60% 0.61% 
Portugal 1.21% 1.21% 0.00% 
Singapore 1.20% 1.04% 0.16% 
Poland 1.18% 0.85% 0.33% 
Turkey 1.10% 0.88% 0.22% 
China 1.10% 0.79% 0.31% 
Brazil 1.05% 0.96% 0.09% 
Romania 1.02% 0.83% 0.19% 
Bulgaria 1.00% 0.74% 0.26% 
Ireland 0.95% 0.80% 0.15% 
Thailand 0.68% 0.59% 0.09% 
Hungary 0.67% 0.64% 0.03% 
Hong Kong 0.59% 0.50% 0.09% 
Russia 0.54% 0.53% 0.01% 
Slovenia 0.51% 0.48% 0.03% 
Belgium 0.42% 0.40% 0.02% 
Mexico 0.39% 0.37% 0.02% 
Malaysia 0.38% 0.31% 0.07% 
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Chile 0.37% 0.34% 0.03% 
Venezuela 0.33% 0.33% 0.00% 
Egypt 0.30% 0.27% 0.03% 
Colombia 0.11% 0.11% 0.00% 
Peru 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 
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Table 2: Private Equity Investments across Industries 
This table presents the industry distribution of total private equity capital invested globally 
between 1990 and 2011. Industry classifications are at Industry Classification Benchmark’s 
super-sector level. Column 1 reports values for total private equity, Column 2 for buyout, and 
Column 3 for venture capital. Amounts are in 2011 billion dollars, and provide the total 
amount of capital invested into a specific industry over the sample period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 
Industry 
PE Capital 
Invested  
($bn) 
Buyout Capital 
Invested  
($bn) 
Venture Capital 
Invested  
($bn) 
Technology 258.57 124.78 133.78 
Industrial Goods & Services 188.49 173.99   14.50 
Health Care 168.30 104.22   64.07 
Retail 120.82 106.93   13.89 
Media 102.06 94.01     8.04 
Financial Services   78.78 69.85     8.93 
Travel & Leisure 65.32 62.99     2.33 
Telecommunications 64.95 51.92     13.03 
Personal & HH Goods 53.90 50.76      3.14 
Food & Beverage 33.83 32.13      1.70 
Oil & Gas 32.13 27.16 4.98 
Insurance 27.39 26.32 1.08 
Chemicals 26.91 25.74 1.16 
Construction & Materials 25.70 24.34 1.36 
Real Estate 21.76 20.37 1.39 
Utilities 20.96 19.04 1.92 
Automobiles & Parts 19.29 17.69 1.60 
Banks 17.08 15.79 1.29 
Basic Resources 11.63 11.04 0.59 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the industry and country-level variables in Panel A 
and B, respectively. Variable definitions are in Table 12. Private equity, buyout, and venture 
capital invested are measured as a percentage of industry sales. Private equity, buyout, and 
venture capital invested with a plus provide summary statistics for the PE variables excluding 
the country-industry-years with no investment. Growth variables are measured as log 
differences. Industry growth variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 5% of the 
distribution. Summary statistics are in percentages.  
Panel A: Industry-level 
Variable N  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
PE Capital Invested 11,764 0.97 0.00 7.06 
Buyout Capital Invested 11,764 0.77 0.00 5.94 
Venture Capital Invested 11,764 0.20 0.00 2.98 
PE Capital Invested
+
 4,071 2.81 0.23 11.79 
Buyout Capital Invested
+
 3,579 2.54 0.24 10.56 
Venture Capital Invested
+
 1,994 1.72 0.13 8.50 
Employment Growth 11,764 7.07 2.44 16.24 
Profit Margin Growth 11,764 0.77  0.15 47.86 
Productivity Growth 11,764 6.55 7.09 20.95 
CAPEX Growth 10,459 9.86 7.61 38.39 
Industry Returns 10,514 9.81 12.19 21.43 
Debt Growth 9,052 14.05 9.42 34.54 
 
Panel B: Country-level 
Variable N  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
GDP Growth 1,004 2.23 2.53 3.79 
Stocks Traded to GDP 975 47.95 22.49 71.35 
Private Credit to GDP 983 80.72 76.48 52.03 
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Table 4: Univariate Comparisons 
This table shows that public companies in country-industries with more private equity 
investments on average have higher growth. The table presents mean (median) comparisons. 
Columns 1 and 2 present means (medians), and Column 3 presents p-values for the 
difference in means (medians) using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) in both Panels. Panel 
A compares means (medians) of country-industry-years with and without private equity 
capital. Panel B compares means (medians) for country-industry-years with high versus low 
amounts of private equity capital among the country-industry-years with non-zero private 
equity investments. Employment growth is the log difference in industry-level employment 
for public firms between time t and t-1. Profit margin growth is the log difference in 
industry-level net profits over sales for public firms between time t and t-1. Productivity 
growth is the log difference in industry-level sales per employee for public firms between 
time t and t-1. CAPEX growth is the log difference in industry-level capital expenditures for 
public firms between time t and t-1. Industry returns is the log difference in the value of the 
industry stock return index between time t and t-1. Debt growth is the log difference in 
industry-level net debt for public firms between time t and t-1. Stocks traded to GDP is the 
total value of stocks traded in the country as a percentage of GDP. Private credit to GDP is 
the total credit in the country as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Panel A: PE versus NON-PE Country-Industries-Years 
 1 2 3 
Variable PE NON-PE 
P-Value  
Mean (Median) 
Difference 
Employment Growth (%) 7.55 (3.78) 6.81 (1.69) 0.02 (0.00)  
Profit Margin Growth (%) 1.74 (0.97) 0.26 (0.00)  0.09 (0.07) 
Productivity Growth (%) 6.09 (6.28) 6.80 (7.59) 0.08 (0.01) 
CAPEX Growth (%) 9.22 (7.94) 10.20 (11.66) 0.30 (0.92) 
Industry Returns (%) 9.54 (13.00) 9.96 (11.66)  0.50 (0.88) 
Debt Growth (%) 14.01 (8.95) 14.07 (9.74)  0.95 (0.98) 
GDP Growth (%) 2.05 (2.01) 2.23 (2.34)  0.01 (0.00) 
Stocks Traded to GDP (%) 101.99 (75.47) 46.46 (25.53) 0.00 (0.00) 
Private Credit to GDP (%) 117.44 (113.19) 86.72 (82.91) 0.00 (0.00) 
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Panel B: HIGH-PE versus LOW-PE Country-Industry-Years 
 1 2 3 
Variable HIGH PE LOW PE 
P-Value  
Mean (Median) 
Difference 
Employment Growth (%) 8.64 (4.61) 6.45 (3.18) 0.00 (0.00)  
Profit Margin Growth (%) 3.62 (1.09) -0.01 (0.78)  0.05 (0.07) 
Productivity Growth (%) 6.14 (6.24) 6.03 (6.32) 0.86 (0.80) 
CAPEX Growth (%) 9.89 (9.02) 8.55 (6.99) 0.30 (0.13) 
Industry Returns (%) 10.71 (14.02) 8.39 (11.78)  0.01 (0.01) 
Debt Growth (%) 14.90 (10.55) 13.22 (7.86)  0.27 (0.18) 
GDP Growth (%) 2.25 (2.11) 1.85 (1.98)  0.00 (0.00) 
Stocks Traded to GDP (%) 109.35 (81.67) 94.88 (70.95) 0.00 (0.00) 
Private Credit to GDP (%) 117.74 (113.39) 117.13 (112.99) 0.72 (0.65) 
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Table 5: Private Equity and the Real Economy 
This table presents the results of the panel VAR estimation of equation 1 from Section 4, 
where the X vector consists of the private equity capital invested, industry-level employment 
growth, labor productivity growth and profitability growth. The system is estimated with 
system GMM. Variable definitions are in Table 12. Country-industry and time fixed effects 
are included in the estimation as defined in Section 4. Reported numbers show the 
coefficients of regressing the column variables on the lags of the row variables. 
Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.    
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1564** 
(0.0668) 
 0.1186** 
(0.5507) 
 0.1770*** 
(0.0566) 
 0.3731** 
(0.1404) 
Employment Growth (t-1)  0.0021 
(0.0027) 
 0.1308*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0070 
(0.0163) 
-0.0484 
(0.0424) 
Productivity Growth (t-1)  0.0012  
(0.0021) 
 0.0657*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0534*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0196 
(0.0328) 
Profitability Growth (t-1) -0.0002 
(0.0007) 
 0.0062** 
(0.0027) 
 0.0027 
(0.0035) 
-0.2282*** 
(0.0116) 
N Obs. 10,284       
  
64 
 
Table 6: Buyout versus Venture Capital 
This table repeats the estimation presented in Table 5, separately for buyout and venture 
capital. Panel A and B present the results for buyout and venture capital, respectively. 
Variable definitions are in Table A2. Country-industry and time fixed effects are included in 
the estimation as defined in Section 4. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing 
the column variables on the lags of the row variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.    
Panel A: Buyout 
 
Buyout 
Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
Buyout Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1551* 
(0.0876) 
 0.1149** 
(0.0518) 
 0.0647 
(0.0746) 
 0.3139* 
(0.1864) 
Employment Growth (t-1)  0.0007 
(0.0026) 
 0.1309*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0066 
(0.0163) 
-0.1480 
(0.1424) 
Productivity Growth (t-1) -0.0003  
(0.0021) 
 0.0657*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0535*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0197 
(0.0328) 
Profitability Growth (t-1) -0.0003 
(0.0007) 
 0.0062** 
(0.0027) 
 0.0027 
(0.0035) 
-0.2281*** 
(0.0116) 
N Obs. 10,284       
 
Panel B: Venture Capital 
 
Venture 
Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
Venture Capital Invested (t-1)  0.2341** 
(0.1171) 
 0.0605 
(0.1409) 
 0.6887*** 
(0.1940) 
 0.5416 
(0.7421) 
Employment Growth (t-1)  0.0013  
(0.0010) 
 0.1312*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0070 
(0.0163) 
-0.1476 
(0.1424) 
Productivity Growth (t-1)  0.0006  
(0.0007) 
 0.0655***  
(0.0097) 
-0.0535*** 
(0.0128) 
-0.0200 
(0.0329) 
Profitability Growth (t-1)  0.0000  
(0.0002) 
 0.0061** 
(0.0027) 
 0.0025 
(0.0035) 
-0.2283*** 
(0.0116) 
N Obs. 10,284       
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Table 7: Private Equity and Investment 
This table presents the results of the four-variable panel VAR estimation with GMM, where 
the X vector consists of private equity capital invested, industry-level cash flow growth, 
capital expenditures growth and market-to-book growth, similar to Love and Zicchino 2006. 
Variable definitions are in Table 12. Country-industry and time fixed effects are included in 
the estimation as defined in Section 4. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing 
the column variables on the lags of the row variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.    
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Cash Flow 
Growth 
Capex 
Growth 
Market-to 
book Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1821** 
(0.0905) 
 0.4868 
(0.7008) 
 0.5975** 
(0.2666) 
 0.1429   
(0.0927) 
Cash Flow Growth (t-1) -0.0004  
(0.0005) 
-0.2926*** 
(0.0168) 
 0.0056** 
(0.0025) 
 0.0036** 
(0.0016) 
Capex Growth (t-1) -0.0007 
(0.0012) 
 0.0455 
(0.0354) 
-0.0764*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0124  
(0.0104) 
Market-to-book Growth (t-1)  0.0007 
(0.0032) 
-0.0173 
(0.0832) 
 0.1827*** 
(0.0310) 
-0.0819*** 
(0.0135) 
N Obs. 7,871      
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Table 8: Spillovers from Private Equity and Legal Strength 
This table repeats the analysis presented in Table 5 for subsamples of countries created based 
on the level of legal strength, and reports the coefficients on the PE variable only. Panel A 
and B present the results for the subsamples of countries with weak versus strong legal 
institutions, respectively. Panel C and D present the results for the subsamples of countries 
with weak versus strong intellectual property rights, respectively. The coefficients for the 
private equity variable are presented only, but the estimation is identical to the panel VAR in 
Table 5. Variable definitions are in Table 12. Country-industry and time fixed effects are 
included in the estimation as defined in Section 4. Reported numbers show the coefficients of 
regressing the column variables on the lags of the row variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.    
Panel A: Low Institutional Quality 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1309** 
(0.0513) 
 0.1250 
(0.0896) 
 0.1135 
(0.1041) 
-0.0023    
(0.3177) 
N Obs.  5,023    
 
Panel B: High Institutional Quality 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.2826* 
(0.1556) 
 0.1044* 
(0.0631) 
 0.2524* 
(0.1481) 
 0.8514*** 
(0.3239) 
N Obs.  5,261    
 
Panel C: Weak Intellectual Property Rights 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1294* 
(0.0715) 
 0.1224  
(0.0899) 
 0.1192 
(0.1041) 
-0.0167    
(0.3178) 
N Obs.  4,897    
 
Panel D: Strong Intellectual Property Rights 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.2795* 
(0.1649) 
 0.1061 
(0.0827) 
 0.2472* 
(0.1379) 
 0.8658** 
(0.4234) 
N Obs.  5,387    
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Table 9: Spillovers from Private Equity and Innovative Capacity 
This table repeats the analysis presented in Table 5 for three subsamples of countries created 
based on a measure innovative capacity, and reports the coefficients on the PE variable only. 
Panel A, B and C present the results for the subsamples of countries with lowest, highest and 
moderate levels of innovative capacity. The subsample of countries with the lowest (highest) 
innovative capacity includes the countries in the bottom (top) 25
th
 percentile. The subsample 
of countries with moderate innovative capacity includes the countries that are in between the 
25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the distribution. The coefficients for the private equity variable are 
presented only, but the estimation is identical to the panel VAR in Table 5. Variable 
definitions are in Table 12. Country-industry and time fixed effects are included in the 
estimation as defined in Section 4. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the 
column variables on the lags of the row variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors 
are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.    
Panel A: Lowest Innovative Capacity 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1527* 
(0.1321) 
 0.0637 
(0.0780) 
 0.0698 
(0.1027) 
-0.2876     
(0.2999) 
N Obs.  2,567    
 
Panel B: Highest Innovative Capacity 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1569* 
(0.0829) 
 0.0922 
(0.1274) 
 0.1188 
(0.1436) 
 0.2157 
(0.5260) 
N Obs.  2,839    
 
Panel C: Moderate Innovative Capacity 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1051** 
(0.0483) 
 0.1557* 
(0.0908) 
 0.2505** 
(0.1228) 
 0.8306** 
(0.3763) 
N Obs.  5,357    
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Table 10: Spillovers from Private Equity and Competitiveness 
This table repeats the analysis presented in Table 5 for subsamples of countries created based 
on the level of competition, and reports the coefficients on the PE variable only. Panel A and 
B present the results for the subsamples of countries with low versus high levels of 
competition, measured by the industry-level gross margins, respectively. Low (high) 
competition country-industries have gross margins below (above) the median of the sample 
distribution. The coefficients for the private equity variable are presented only, but the 
estimation is identical to the panel VAR in Table 5. Variable definitions are in Table 12. 
Country-industry and time fixed effects are included in the estimation as defined in Section 
4. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the column variables on the lag of 
the row variable. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.    
Panel A: Low Competition 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.3257** 
(0.1353) 
 0.0944 
(0.1203) 
-0.0241 
(0.1121) 
 0.3246 
(0.3376) 
N Obs.  4,349    
 
Panel B: High Competition 
 
PE Capital 
Invested 
Employment 
Growth 
Productivity 
Growth 
Profitability 
Growth 
PE Capital Invested (t-1)  0.2570* 
(0.1516) 
 0.1121* 
(0.0621) 
 0.4932** 
(0.2159) 
 0.6936** 
(0.3056) 
N Obs.  4,416    
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Table 11: Private Equity and the Financial Economy 
This table presents the results of the panel VAR estimation of equation 1 from Section 4 
separately for buyout and venture capital, where the X vector consists of private equity 
capital invested, industry-level debt growth, and industry returns. The system is estimated 
with system GMM. Panel A and B present the results for buyout and venture capital, 
respectively. Variable definitions are in Table 12. Country-industry and time fixed effects are 
included in the estimation as defined in Section 4. Reported numbers show the coefficients of 
regressing the column variables on the lags of the row variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.    
Panel A: Buyout 
 
Buyout 
Capital 
Invested 
Debt 
Growth 
Industry 
Returns 
Buyout Capital Invested (t-1)  0.1225*** 
(0.0416) 
 0.4538** 
(0.1961) 
-0.2641** 
(0.1083) 
Debt Growth (t-1)  0.0003  
(0.0006) 
-0.0187* 
(0.0111) 
-0.0149** 
(0.0068) 
Industry Returns (t-1)  0.0016  
(0.0015) 
-0.0112 
(0.0186) 
 0.0182** 
(0.0092) 
N Obs. 7,756     
 
Panel B: Venture Capital 
 
Venture 
Capital 
Invested 
Debt 
Growth 
Industry 
Returns 
Venture Capital Invested (t-1)  0.6184*** 
(0.2274) 
 0.5005 
(0.7940) 
 1.5314*** 
(0.4660) 
Debt Growth (t-1) -0.0002   
(0.0002) 
-0.0186* 
(0.0111) 
-0.0149** 
(0.0068) 
Industry Returns (t-1)  0.0004  
(0.0004) 
-0.0120 
(0.0186) 
 0.0186** 
(0.0093) 
N Obs. 7,756     
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Table 12: Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
This table provides descriptions of data sources and variable definitions used in the paper. 
Panel A defines the data sources, and Panel B presents the variable definitions with the data 
source for the variable in parenthesis. 
Data Sources  
Burgiss The Burgiss Group is a software company that provides data 
record keeping and performance analysis services to the largest 
institutional investors in the private equity universe. Burgiss data 
is aggregated at the industry-level using actual fund investments 
into portfolio companies. 
Datastream Datastream’s Global Equity Indices provide industry indices 
aggregated from financial statements of publicly listed 
companies across 53 countries and 170 sectors worldwide. 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
The development indicators are from World Bank’s primary 
database. It presents the most current and accurate global 
development data available, and includes national, regional and 
global estimates. 
World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) 
GCI assesses the competitiveness landscape of 144 economies, 
providing insight into the drivers of their productivity and 
prosperity. It provides different indices on a country’s legal 
environment, as well as financial and technological 
development. 
Variable Definitions  
PE Capital Invested $ Amount of private equity capital invested, normalized by 
industry sales, and logged. (BURGISS) 
Buyout Capital Invested $ Amount of buyout capital invested, normalized by industry 
sales, and logged. (BURGISS) 
Venture Capital Invested $ Amount of venture capital invested, normalized by industry 
sales, and logged. (BURGISS) 
Employment Growth Log difference in industry employment between time t and t-1. 
(DATASTREAM) 
Profitability Growth Log difference in industry profit margins, net profit over sales, 
between time t and t-1. (DATASTREAM) 
Labor Productivity 
Growth 
Log difference in industry sales per employee between time t 
and t-1. (DATASTREAM) 
CAPEX Growth Log difference in industry capital expenditures between time t 
and t-1. Capital expenditures include, but are not limited to, 
additions to property, plant and equipment as well as 
investments in machinery and equipment. 
Cash Flow Growth Log difference in industry free cash flow between time t and t-1. 
Free cash flow is the sum of funds from operations, funds 
from/used for other operating activities and extraordinary items. 
Industry Returns Log difference in the value of the industry return index retrieved 
from DataStream Global Equity Indices between time t and t-1. 
(DATASTREAM) 
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Debt Growth Log difference in industry debt, total debt net of cash and cash 
equivalents, between time t and t-1. (DATASTREAM) 
Market-to-book Growth Log difference in the price-to-book index of an industry between 
time t and t-1. (DATASTREAM) 
Stocks Traded to GDP  Total value of stocks traded over GDP. (WDI) 
Private Credit to GDP Total amount of private credit over GDP. (WDI) 
Institutional Quality 
Score 
Measures the institutional quality of a country. It is a 
combination of scores on legal institutions, property rights, 
investor protection as well as judicial efficiency. (GCI) 
Intellectual Property 
Rights 
Measures the strength of intellectual property protection in a 
country. (GCI) 
Innovative Capacity Measures a country’s capacity to innovate and adapt to new 
technologies. (GCI) 
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Figure 1: Global Private Equity Capital Invested 
 
 
This figure plots the total amount of private equity capital invested in 48 countries between 
1990 and 2011. The solid line plots the total of buyout and venture capital. The dotted line 
plots buyout capital and the dashed line plots venture capital. Amounts are in 2011 billion 
dollars. 
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Figure 2: U.S. and U.K.’s Share of Global Private Equity Capital 
 
This figure plots the share across the U.S. and U.K. out of the total amount of global private 
equity capital invested between 1990 and 2011. The solid line plots their share out of the 
total of buyout and venture capital invested. The dotted line plots their share out of buyout 
capital and the dashed line plots their share out of venture capital. 
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Figure 3: Private Equity and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
 
 
This figure plots the ratio of the total amount of global private equity capital invested to the 
total amount of global FDI inflows between 1990 and 2011. The solid line plots the ratio for 
the total of buyout and venture capital invested. The dotted line plots the ratio of buyout 
capital and the dashed line plots the ratio of venture capital. The ratio is calculated for every 
country for each year and the average across countries is plotted between 1990 and 2011. 
 
 
  
0
5
10
15
20
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
% 
PE
Buyout
Venture
75 
 
Bibliography 
Acharya, Viral V., Oliver Gottschalg, Moritz Hahn, and Conor Kehoe, 2012, Corporate 
Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity, Review of Financial 
Studies, forthcoming. 
Aitken, Brian J., and Ann E. Harrison, 1999, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela, American Economic Review 89, 605-618. 
Arellano, Manuel, and Olympia Bover, 1995, Another Look at the Instrumental Variable 
Estimation of Error Component Models, Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51. 
Arrow, Kenneth J., 1962, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, Review of 
Economic Studies 29, 155-173. 
Andrade, Gregor, and Steven N. Kaplan, 1998, How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) 
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 
Journal of Finance 53, 1443-1493. 
Balcarcel, Ana, Mike Hertzel, and Laura A. Lindsay, 2012, Contracting Frictions and Cross-
Border Capital Flows: Evidence from Venture Capital, Working Paper. 
Ball, Eric, Hsin Hui Chiu, and Richard Smith, 2011, Can VCs Time the Market? An Analysis 
of Exit Choice for Venture-backed Firms, Review of Financial Studies 24, 3105-3138. 
Barro, Robert J., 1991, Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106, 408-443. 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey, Christian Lundblad, and Stephan Siegel, 2007, Global 
Growth Opportunities and Market Integration, Journal of Finance 62, 1081-1137. 
Bernstein, Jeffrey I., Ishaq M. Nadiri, 1989, Research and Development and Intraindustry 
Spillovers: An Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality, Review of Economic 
Studies 56, 249-269. 
Bernstein, Shai, Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen, and Per Stromberg, 2012, Private Equity and 
Industry Performance, Working Paper. 
Blomstrom, Magnus, 1986, Foreign Investment and Productive Efficiency: The Case of 
Mexico, Journal of Industrial Economics 35, 97-110. 
Blomstrom, Magnus, Steven Globerman, and Ari Kokko, 1999, The Determinants of Host 
Country Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment: Review and Synthesis of the 
Literature, Working Paper.
76 
 
Blomstrom, Magnus, and Ari Kokko, 1998, Multinational Corporations and Spillovers, 
Journal of Economic Surveys 12, 247-277. 
Blomstrom, Magnus, and Hakan Persson, 1983, Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency 
in an Underdeveloped Economy: Evidence from the Mexican Manufacturing 
Industry, World Development 11, 493-503. 
Blomstrom, Magnus, and Edward N. Wolff, 1994, Multinational Corporations and 
Productivity Convergence in Mexico, Convergence of Productivity: Cross-national 
Studies and Historical Evidence, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
243-259. 
Brown, Greg, Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, Steven N. Kaplan, Ruediger Stucke, 2011, 
How Big is the Private Equity Universe?, UNC Kenan Flagler Business School, 
Presentation to UNC Private Equity Conference, October 14, 2011. 
Cantwell, John, 1989, Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Cao, Jerry, and Josh Lerner, 2009, The Performance of Reverse-Leveraged Buyouts, Journal 
of Financial Economics 91, 139-157. 
Caves, Richard ,1974, Multinational Firms, Competition and Productivity in the Host 
Country, Economica 41, 176-193. 
Cochrane, John H., 2005, Time Series for Macroeconomics and Finance, Chicago: University 
of Chicago. 
Cumming , Douglas J., and Uwe Walz, 2009, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around 
the World, Journal of International Business Studies 41, 727-754. 
Cumming, Douglas J., Mike Wright, and Donald S. Siegel, 2007, Private Equity, Leveraged 
Buyouts and Governance, Journal of Corporate Finance 13, 439-460. 
Davis, Steven J., John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, Josh Lerner, and Javier Miranda, 
2009, Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity, Working Paper. 
Davis, Steven J., John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, Josh Lerner, and Javier Miranda, 
2011, Private Equity and Employment, Working Paper. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Ross Levine, 1996, Stock Market Development and Financial 
Intermediaries: Stylized Facts, World Bank Economic Review 10, 291-321. 
Djankov, Simeon, and Bernard Hoekman, 2000, Foreign Investment and Productivity 
Growth in Czech Enterprises, The World Bank Economic Review 14, 49-64. 
77 
 
Feinberg, Susan E., and Sumit K. Majumdar, 2001, Technology Spillovers from Foreign 
Direct Investment in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, Journal of International 
Business Studies 32, 423-437. 
Financial Services Authority, 2006, Private Equity: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory 
Engagement, London: Financial Services Authority. 
Glaeser, Edward L., Hedi Kallal, Jose A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer, 1992, Growth in 
Cities, Journal of Political Economy 100, 1126-1152. 
Globerman, S., 1979, Foreign Direct Investment and `Spillover' Efficiency Benefits in 
Canadian Manufacturing Industries, Canadian Journal of Economics 12, 42-56. 
Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita, 2012, Venture Capital and the Diffusion of Knowledge, Working 
Paper. 
Guo, Shourun, Edith S. Hotchkiss, and Weihong Song, 2011, Do Buyouts (Still) Create 
Value?, Journal of Finance 66, 479-517. 
Haddad, Mona, and Ann E. Harrison, 1993, Are There Positive Spillovers From Direct 
Foreign Investment? Evidence From Panel Data for Morocco, Journal of 
Development Economics 42, 51-74. 
Harford, Jarrad, and Adam C. Kolasinski, 2012, Do Private Equity Sponsors Sacrifice Long-
Term Value for Short-Term Profit? Evidence from a Comprehensive Sample of Large 
Buyouts and Exit Outcomes, Working Paper. 
Harris, Robert S., Tim Jenkinson, and Steven N. Kaplan, 2012, Private Equity Performance: 
What Do We Know?, Working Paper. 
Henry, David, Emily Thornton, and David Kiley, August 6, 2006, Buy It, Strip It, Then Flip 
it, Bloomberg Businessweek, from http://www.businessweek.com. 
Javorcik, Beata S., 2004, Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages, American 
Economic Review 94, 605-627. 
Jenkinson, Tim, Rudiger Stucke, 2011, Who Benefits from the Leverage in LBOs?, Working 
Paper. 
Jensen, Michael, 1989, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harvard Business Review 67, 61-
74. 
Kaplan, Steven N., 1989, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance 
and Value, Journal of Financial Economics 24, 217-254. 
78 
 
Kaplan, Steven N., and Per Stromberg, 2009, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 23, 121-146. 
Kathuria, Vinish, 2002, Liberalisation, FDI, and Productivity Spillovers – An Analysis of 
Indian Manufacturing Firms, Oxford Economic Papers 54, 688-718. 
King, Robert G., and Ross Levine, 1993, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-737. 
Kokko, Ari, 1994, Technology, Market Characteristics, and Spillovers, Journal of 
Development Economics 43, 279-293. 
Kokko, Ari, 1996, Productivity Spillovers from Competition between Local Firms and 
Foreign Affiliates, Journal of International Development 8, 517-530. 
Kogut, Bruce, and Sea Jin Chang, 1991, Technological Capabilities and Japanese Foreign 
Direct Investment in the United States, Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 401-
413. 
Kortum, Samuel S., Josh Lerner, 2000, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to 
Innovation, RAND Journal of Economics 31, 674-692. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Law 
and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
Lerner, Josh, and Antoinette Schoar, 2005, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial 
Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 120, 223-246. 
Lerner, Josh, Morten Sorensen, and Per Stromberg, 2009, Private Equity and Long-Run 
Investment: The Case of Innovation, Working Paper. 
Levine, Ross, 2004, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, NBER Working Paper. 
Love, Inessa, and Lea Zicchino, 2006, Financial Development and Dynamic Investment 
Behavior: Evidence from Panel VAR, The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 46, 190-210. 
Mansfield, Edwin, 1994, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer, IFC Discussion Paper. 
Marshall, Alfred, 1890, Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan. 
Mollica, M., and Luigi Zingales, 2007, The Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation and the 
Creation of New Businesses, Working Paper. 
79 
 
Muscarella, Chris J., and Michael R.Vetsuypens, 1990, Efficiency and Organizational 
Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs, Journal of Finance 45, 1389-1413. 
Popov, Alexander, and Peter Roosenboom, 2008, On the Real Effects of Private Equity 
Investment: Evidence from New Business Creation, Working Paper. 
Popov, Alexander, and Peter Roosenboom, 2012, Venture Capital and Patented Innovation: 
Evidence from Europe, Economic Policy 27, 447-482. 
Romer, Paul M., 1986, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political 
Economy 94, 1002-1037. 
Sims, Christopher, 1980, Macroeconomics and Reality, Econometrica 48, 1-48. 
Sorkin, Andrew R., 2007, September 23, Is Private Equity Giving Hertz a Boost?, New York 
Times, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/business. 
Service Employees International Union, 2007, Behind the Buyouts: Inside the World of 
Private Equity, Washington: SEUI. 
Safieddine, Assam and Sheridan Titman, 1999, Leverage and Corporate Performance: 
Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers, Journal of Finance 54, 547-580
 
